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CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

Petteri Kurkinen

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MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS**

Petteri Kurkinen

Translated by Malcolm Hicks



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PREFACE

This volume is based on my degree dissertation produced for the General Staff Officers' Course at the National Defence College and published in Finnish as issue no. 1/2001 of the publications of the Department of Strategic Studies at that college, under the title "*Siviilisotilasyhteistyö kriisinhallintaoperaatiossa*" (Civil-military cooperation in crisis management operations). My supervisors for this work were Col. Pertti Salminen, Dr.Pol.Sci., and Klaus Törnudd, former Finnish Ambassador to France and the United Nations, to both of whom I wish to express the warmest possible thanks for their guidance at all stages. I also received excellent support from the International Department of the General Staff and the officers serving there.

It was Professor Kalevi Ruhala who suggested while I was serving in the ISAF operation in 2002 that I should update my dissertation in the light of more recent experiences, and I have him to thank for his own personal role in encouraging me to study CIMIC activity further and to publish this research. It is to be hoped that the observations and ideas presented in this volume will provide additional support for CIMIC planning in connection with future operations. I would also thank Mr. Malcolm Hicks, without whose fluent and styl-

Major Petteri Kurkinen graduated from the General Staff Officers' Course at the National Defence College in 2001, having previously served as chief of the CIMIC Office of the Finnish Battalion (S5 of FinBn) in the SFOR operation for the period 8/1997 – 1/1999 and as CIMIC advisor to the Multinational Division (North) headquarters (MND(N) HQ G5/advisor) in 2001. He also served in the ISAF operation in 2002, as operation officer in the CIMIC branch of the Finnish Detachment in Afghanistan. At present he is attached to the Headquarters of the Eastern Command of the Finnish Defence Forces.

ish translation it would not have been possible to make the results of my work available in English to the extent achieved here.

My interest in CIMIC activity and in research into it was aroused in 1998, when I was serving as CIMIC officer at the headquarters of the Finnish Battalion in the SFOR operation. It was in that operation that CIMIC activity became a part of the operative aspect of the mission to the extent that is common nowadays, although admittedly the maintaining of good relations with representatives of the local population and administration has always formed an inherent and very natural part of Finnish peace-keeping activities. This may be traced to the nation's military culture as a whole, for the defence of our own country has traditionally been governed by a principle of close cooperation between the military and civil authorities. One essential requirement for a comprehensive study of CIMIC activity was a knowledge of civilian organizations and their ways of working. This I have gained partly through training in cooperation between military and civilian authorities in crisis areas arranged by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The perspective adopted was predominantly in line with UN views. This provided me with valuable information on such topics as the way in which various civilian organizations work in operations of different kinds and how they look upon collaboration with the military. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Fred Polk and Mr. Josef Reiterer for the high-quality instruction I received in these matters.

Finally I would like to thank my family and friends, above all Virpi and similarly Jyrki and Minna, for the support and encouragement that I have received from them in the course of this work and when serving abroad as part of the international community.

I have had the opportunity to work with representatives of many nationalities in peacekeeping operations, and national differences in ways of doing things have very often come to the fore in the context of CIMIC activities, but in spite of these differences all the nationalities taking part have without exception had the same objective in mind, to restore peace and guarantee adequate living conditions for the local people. Success in CIMIC work calls for coordination within the military organization, and this is only possible when all the people working in this branch accept the goals laid down for it.

One of greatest challenges for CIMIC staff in the future will be to participate very closely in the planning processes affecting their

own organization, as this is the best way of ensuring that local conditions, ways of life and special characteristics are taken into account when planning the role to be played by their own troops.

When I was serving in the ISAF operation the commander once described CIMIC activity very aptly in just two words: COOPERATE – COORDINATE.

Mikkeli, 27th November 2003,

*Petteri Kurkinen,
Major, G.S.*

1 THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COMPONENTS AS OBJECTS OF INVESTIGATION

1.1 Towards a broad-based concept of crisis management operations

It was widely believed that the end of the Cold War would herald a new era of peace in international relations, but contrary to these optimistic expectations, regional conflicts, especially ones of an ethno-political nature, have increased in number, at least momentarily, and have become part of our everyday reality in Europe. At the same time the changes that have taken place in the international system have meant that such crises have adopted a more rapid tempo than previously.¹

Conflicts can differ greatly in their nature and form. Perhaps the most significant as far as international politics are concerned are conflicts of interest, in which the interests of certain states or groups are openly at variance. The occurrence of such conflicts is partly dependent on the ability of states to protect the rights of different sectors of the community, most notably minorities, so that they do not feel that the state and its actions, or any other groups within society, are a threat to their own sense of community. Internal conflicts within states were indeed typical of the situation in the 1990s, one prominent exacerbating factor being nationalism, which served as a political catalyst in numerous serious crises, e.g. in the former Yugoslavia.²

In recent years the international community has been faced with the consequences of globalization. Movements opposed to the hegemony enjoyed by the United States and the West in general and to the globalization trends that were perceived to be linked with this began to emerge around the turn of the millennium, the most conspicuous perhaps being the manifestations of radical Islam in the Middle East and Central Asia and the mass demonstrations held at meetings of heads of state in the West, e.g. the riots in Seattle, Gothenburg and Genoa. The most destructive act directed at the supremacy of the West to date was the series of terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11th September 2001.³

The means of exercising control over international or ethnopo-

litical conflicts that are available to the international community are either peaceful, involving negotiation and mediation between the parties concerned, or based on the use of force. Examples of the latter would include the pre-emptive air strikes on Serb targets in Bosnia undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on a mandate from the United Nations (UN) in 1995 for the purpose of bringing the conflict under control and preventing it from escalating.⁴

Traditional peace-keeping operations have required the agreement of the parties involved to the placement in the crisis area of troops having no part in the dispute, who use of force is restricted to self-defence. The UN peacekeeping operations in the area of the former Yugoslavia nevertheless demonstrated that the modes of action available to such troops are inadequate for achieving the desired outcome, and the international community was obliged to look for new approaches.⁵

In the extended notion of peacekeeping, the use of international troops does not necessarily presuppose acquiescence by the parties to the dispute, although all such operations so far have taken place with the agreement of at least one party. On the other hand, the use of force is still reactive in nature, i.e. it is governed by the same principles as in a traditional peace-keeping operation.⁶

Nowadays these extended peacekeeping operations, also known as crisis management operations, may be led by a coalition, a group of countries formed specifically for this purpose, or an individual state. These actors have their own military organizations and can command and service their own troops. They are also typically able to act independently in relatively large operations. The UN, on the other hand, lacks these crucial advantages. It is thus to be expected that the leading role of a coalition or co-ordinator state will be a prominent factor in military crisis management operations in the future, the mandate for such an action being obtained from the UN or a regional organization such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This mandate is required at least to set out the judicial basis for the operation, define its nature, the rights of the troops engaged in it and the limitations on their actions. It should also define the goal of the operation.⁷

The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) operations have been based on UN mandates and a powerful military presence by which attempts have been made to create

appropriate conditions for resolving the crisis. Both have involved a high degree of military pressure and intervention on the part of the international community, and both have been characterized by the fact that the representatives of the military organization have taken virtually all the functions of society in the area under their immediate supervision at the initial stage in the operation, thus enabling the international civilian organizations to begin their own operations.⁸

One precondition for the success of a crisis management operation is a detailed knowledge of the special conditions prevailing in the area concerned. These always have to be taken into consideration by the international instances when planning, preparing and implementing their own activities. Typical aspects of the operating environment for past and present crisis management initiatives in the Balkans have been the huge refugee problems relative to the size of the population, the destruction of social structures and the material devastation of towns and villages, together with the severe deterioration in the economic situation, the bitterness felt by the opposing parties towards each other and the spiralling of acts of revenge. The armed conflicts in the area have also been unusual in that the violence and hostilities have not been confined to the front lines between the troops but have spread to the towns and villages according to the balance of numbers between the ethnic groups. This has led to a need to evacuate civilian populations from their homes, either to safer areas within their own country or to a life as refugees abroad.⁹

It has also been necessary for the international military organizations in Bosnia and Kosovo to take account of the influence of other actors on the execution of their operations, including international organizations (IOs), international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), representatives of the local administrations and the population of the area.¹⁰

The guidelines for the actions of the military organization and the main civilian organizations in a crisis management operation are laid down separately for each operation in the agreement that governs it, and it is clear that the success of each actor is dependent on a knowledge of the tasks and ways of working of the others. It is not easy to work in a multinational environment in which the number of separate actors is large and the prevailing conditions place great demands on the collaboration ability of the representatives of the

various organizations.¹¹

The international community in Bosnia and Kosovo has sought a solution to the crises and the need for peaceful development in the area through a holistic approach in which a broad, complex non-military component has grown up alongside the military activity.¹² The organizations responsible for these non-military tasks in the Europe of today are principally the UN and OSCE, while the European Union (EU) has now initiated measures for developing its capabilities to a level that would allow it to operate in the main areas of civilian crisis management in the future.¹³

National and international non-governmental organizations have a significant role to play in the development of a society that finds itself in crisis, often being capable of issuing an early warning of such a situation. They are also capable in many instances of rapid, flexible, diversified action of a kind that can be put into effect easily. Their role tends to be emphasized further in cases where international organizations can no longer show the necessary commitment to an area.¹⁴

The increase in the number of factors involved in crisis management operations nevertheless presents new challenges for all the organizations concerned, above all in terms of collaboration ability. The military organizations have had to develop their functions in a new direction, known as Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), in order to achieve their goals and be capable of coordinating cooperation with civilian actors and making full use of the resources available. The planning of such activity has been greatly influenced by the doctrine of Civil Affairs adopted in the United States, experiences in the former Yugoslavia and the operational patterns of those states that have adopted a Total Defence system. We shall use the abbreviation CIMIC in the discussion below to refer to **C**ivil-**M**ilitary Cooperation.¹⁵

Most of the countries that have taken part in the Bosnia and Kosovo operations have adopted CIMIC as one branch of their troops' crisis management operations, but considerable national differences exist nowadays both at the theoretical level and in matters of practical implementation, representing a potential source of friction within the international military organization. A good example of this was provided by experiences with the initiation of the ISAF operation.¹⁶

The military organizations have done much to develop their

capabilities for working together with other actors involved in crisis management operations, and experiences in the Balkans have served as a catalyst in this respect. The British commander of the KFOR troops in 1999, Sir Michael Jackson, for instance, said in a seminar on leadership in crisis management operations held in Holland on 5th - 7th June 2000 that the successful running of such an operation required, among other things, control over the "vacuum phenomenon", by which he meant that the military needed to have means of participating in the restoration of practically all aspects of society. He also laid weight on possession of the expertise required under the prevailing conditions and of the correct attitude towards this task.¹⁷

Representatives of the civilian component are still to some extent lacking in the ability to cooperate with an international military organization, and some civilian actors do not necessarily even wish to do so. For the main civilian organizations, the Lead Agencies, this is virtually essential, however, and they have already developed their functions and capabilities in this field. The UN, for example, has set up a Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) to improve coordination between political, military and civilian functions within an operation. Practical activities in the field are nevertheless frequently hampered by shortages of staff and inadequate means of communication.¹⁸

Well-functioning contacts with the representatives of the local administration and population are essential for those in charge of the international military and civilian components, and this calls for cooperation and co-ordination between actors in order to exploit all the available resources to the full. The active exchange of intelligence is one means by which international actors can demonstrate their professional skills and their integration with the local population.¹⁹

1.2 Purposes of this research, the topic and its delimitation

Two principal purposes can be stated for this research, the first of which is to set out principles for the planning of CIMIC in connection with peacekeeping or crisis management operations. This will be done by distinguishing the sectors of civilian crisis management and the problems that troops may encounter in future operations. This is closely connected with the trends discernible in European

crisis management and the discussion that has evolved around this. It should be possible in the framework of this research to provide examples that may be of help in planning and implementing such activities, training staff and integrating functions at both a national and an international level. It is possible to achieve this aim by exploring the ways in which the military component can provide support for the civilian component and making a survey of the factors that impose limitations on this. The treatment of this topic will be based on interviews with experts. The second purpose is to create a theoretical foundation for CIMIC on the basis of existing guidelines and research. Experiences of CIMIC will be reviewed primarily from a Finnish perspective.

The main topic of the work can be summed up in the question:

How can a military organization provide support for the various aspects of civilian crisis management in a joint operation?

This may be approached in terms of a set of secondary questions:

- What does civilian crisis management consist of?
- What factors have influenced CIMIC as implemented by the Finns?
- How has the military component provided support for the work of the civilian component in the SFOR, KFOR and ISAF operations?
- How should CIMIC be organized at the various stages in an operation?

The topic is located at a multidimensional interface in a crisis management operation formed by the civilian component and the military component, the emphasis in the present work being upon the actions of the military component at this interface.

The perspective adopted here is that of Finnish participation in complex crisis management operations. As a member of the EU, Finland has had no reservations in committing itself to this trend, especially as the EU is engaged in constructing a relatively broad range of means by which it can intervene more efficiently in crises that

may emerge within its own boundaries or in neighbouring areas. As far as participation is concerned, it is important to be aware of the means and operational models that are currently available for preventing outbreaks of violence, and if prevention in advance should prove unsuccessful, it is also necessary to recognise the means by which reconstruction can be initiated in the wake of a crisis within society.

We will concentrate here on those civilian crisis management measures that are likely to be used in a multiple civilian-military operation, omitting for the present purpose measures that might be adopted by a civil society in the face of a major peacetime disturbance such as an environmental catastrophe. In other words, our consideration of civilian crisis management will concentrate on identifying a frame of reference for CIMIC.

The actions of the civilian and military components of a multiple crisis management operation will be examined at both the local and the regional level, taking note of the national level only at points where this is necessary for the discussion as a whole.

The research will concentrate on the actions of national crisis management troops and multinational troops at the brigade level. Again, higher levels will be considered where this is essential for the discussion as a whole.

The research is restricted to the IFOR/SFOR, KFOR and ISAF operations, with the principle accent on IFOR/SFOR and ISAF.

1.3 Methods and point of departure

This research is based on the examination of documents, backed up by interviews with experts. This is particularly the case with the analysis of civilian crisis management, the intention being to present this as a maximally broad-based entity, defining its branches of activity in the light of experiences in the Balkans. This means that the branches as such constitute a very much wider entity than do the focal points designated in the EU planning work.

The theoretical picture of CIMIC activity will be formed from the regulations governing the individual fields of activity together with other instructions, and filled out with orders and directives applying to individual operations.

The support provided by the military for representatives of the

civilian component is described on the basis of interviews, the data being filled out with information from reports on individual operations.

Chapter 5, which contains solutions to the problems of planning and implementing CIMIC, may be regarded as one of the results of the work. It is based on the conclusions reached as a consequence of the research and observations made in the course of it.

In spite of their undeniable role in implementing non-military activities, the work of the UN and OSCE will not be discussed here.

The disposition of this research is set out in Appendix 1 and its frame of reference in Appendix 2.

1.4 Definitions of certain central concepts

CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation):

According to NATO doctrine, CIMIC is defined as co-ordination and cooperation that takes place between the commander of the troops and the civilian population, i.e. the population of the area covered by the operation, its various organizations and administrative authorities and representatives of international organizations and non-governmental organizations.²⁰

CIMIC will be taken in the context of this work to apply to activities designed for the obtaining of information on the area of operation, the international civilian community, the local authorities and the population of the area as required for the troops in order to fulfil their own objectives. CIMIC is thus looked on as a means by which the military component of a crisis management operation arranges its support in order to achieve the goals of the civilian actors as part of the overall objective of the operation.²¹

Crisis:

The term crisis as used here should be taken to refer to any disturbance of an economic, political or military kind, of which the extreme external manifestation is a state of war. Such an event may be divided temporally into a pre-crisis stage, the crisis proper and a post-crisis reconstruction stage.

Crisis management:

The term crisis management was adopted in international politics

in the 1990s, and appears in the final resolution of the OSCE summit meeting of 1992 at a point where the discussion concerns the creation of new means of preventing conflicts in advance. The UN terminology at that time referred to “extended peacekeeping activity”. The EU adopted the term in conjunction with its new treaty which came into force on 1st May 1999.²²

Crisis management is taken here to mean all political, humanitarian and economic actions taken to prevent a crisis from arising, prevent it from coming to a head, prevent its influence from spreading or create conditions conducive to a political solution and a restoration of social stability.²³

Military crisis management:

Military crisis management means here peacekeeping activities, military intervention or control over the prevailing situation that is exercised by military means and forms of organization for security policy or humanitarian reasons. Resort will be had to such methods in




Figure 1. Temporal and functional division of a crisis management operation from a military perspective.

situations where a crisis poses a threat to international peace and security or infringes common concepts or norms, e.g. regarding human rights. It does not include the activities allowed for in Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter.²⁴

A crisis management operation may be divided temporally and functionally into three phases, enforcement, maintenance and withdrawal, as depicted in Figure 1.

Also contained in Figure 1 is an indication of the progression from operative activity to CIMIC activity as the operation advances towards its stated objective. Although the shift in emphasis is shown here as a smooth process, it is possible in practice that there may be brief shifts of emphasis within the phases depicted. The holding of national elections in the area of operation during the enforcement phase, for example, could raise the emphasis on CIMIC for a limited period.

Civilian crisis management:

Civilian crisis management refers here to the prevention of conflicts in advance, their resolution and the alleviation of their consequences, cooperation between the rescue authorities and the provision of expert advisers through international organizations, similarly the activities of non-governmental organizations when directed at achieving the overall objectives of the operation or at reconstructing civil society.²⁵

Civilian crisis management is typically multidimensional in character, involving a complex group of actors. Military crisis management requires the support of certain elements of civilian crisis management in order to enable peaceful development to be achieved in the long term, and correspondingly it is apt to support the civilian component simply through its function of creating a secure operating environment.

The purpose of civilian crisis management is to eliminate the factors that have led to the disturbance in society and thereby to create the conditions necessary for the state to develop independently through measures of its own.²⁶ Fluctuations in the volumes of civilian and military crisis management activity as a function of time during an operation are depicted in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Volumes of civilian and military crisis management activity relative to time during an operation.

1.5 Sources, notes and validity of sources

The principal body of source material for this work was a set of interviews carried out with experts in this field between 1999 and 2001. The data obtained from these form the framework for the research, which is then filled out from documentary sources.

Practically all those interviewed had personal experience of crisis management operations, and the answers obtained from them represented their subjective opinions, and are therefore bound to a certain place or point in time. Exceptions to this are those people who deal with matters related to crisis management operations in the course of their normal work, as they were able to place their own experience in a wider context. These interviews have provided a valuable addition to the content of the present work. A few interviews were also conducted with foreign persons serving in Bosnia whose work meant that they were closely involved in military-civilian co-operation. Their contribution has added breadth to the researcher's view of the situation.

Use has also been made of the periodic reports submitted by Finnish contingents attached to the different operations. These re-

ports are highly reliable, but the real content is barely relevant to a work of this kind, and the information available from them is mostly restricted to references to certain measures that were taken. They contain no accurate reviews of the situation or descriptions of related tasks. Recourse was therefore had to other sources in order to fill in the missing information, largely the interviews and Internet sources.

A publication in the nature of a report produced by the Swedish Military Academy on the basis of a seminar connected with the Haiti operation contains some discussion of experiences of cooperation between civilians and military personnel. It contains no conclusions, however, possibly on account of its original nature, and can be regarded most of all as a compilation of personal experiences.

NATO's CIMIC doctrine has undergone considerable changes in the last few years. It is a practicable set of instructions for planning purposes on a general level, but its greatest weakness lies in the fact that it is intimately connected with troop activities. The troops representing a coalition are primarily under separate national command, and if the orders given are compatible with those of the organization as a whole, they will also be obeyed. This has become evident in both the interviews and the documents.

Internet sources have also played a major part in this research. These may be grouped as follows: 1) newspaper archives, 2) organizations' home pages, 3) research papers and reports, and 4) instructions and regulations.

The majority of Internet sources are nevertheless fundamentally biased. The pages produced by NATO and its subordinate organizations such as SFOR and KFOR, for instance, contain no material that approaches its topics critically, as they concentrated for the most part on highly optimistic pictures of various events and actions. They are therefore of minimal value when studying the implementation of practical measures. The same also applies to the organization's own newspapers and other publications, although the NATO Review does adopt a highly neutral attitude towards its own measures. As far as the study of practical measures is concerned, however, the above sources do not contribute. The necessary criticism was applied to the sources mostly in the course of the work, the detailed information obtained from the interviews being examined in connection with publications and reports from the same period. No source-critical material as such is to be found in this report, apart from an eval-

uation of the documentary evidence contained in Chapter 3, which discusses the regulations and special commands governing the activity itself.

Where mention is made in the text of events, terms and assumptions that are not otherwise dealt with in that connection, more detailed explanations will be found in the list of references.

2 CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

2.1 Civilian crisis management from a European Union viewpoint

When setting out to examine the principles and aims of the European Union with respect to civilian crisis management we should also be prepared to take note of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ongoing process for developing a crisis management capability, as these have influenced planning of the implementation of EU civilian crisis management.²⁷

The European Union has been developing its own crisis management capability as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the present guidelines for which are set out in the Maastricht Agreement, which came into force on 1st November 1993. The purpose of this policy is to create stability in Europe following the political upheavals of the early 1990s. The process was stimulated in part by the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, which cast serious doubts on the viability and unanimity of EU foreign policy. By ratifying the Maastricht Agreement, the member states undertook, among other things, to intensify their cooperation in matters of foreign policy and accepted the general goal of the programme, under which the CFSP would concern itself with all questions of security within the organization, including the definition of a long-term defence policy, which might lead eventually to a common defence system.²⁸

The Maastricht Agreement replaced the Amsterdam Agreement that had applied since 1st May 1999, preserving the notions of inter-governmental consultation and solidarity as the basic principles of the CFSP. Particular attention was drawn to the preparation of the CFSP and to achieving greater efficiency in its decision-making procedures and execution. The crucial point as far as crisis management is concerned is clause 17, by which the "Petersberg Obligations", i.e. humanitarian and rescue obligations, peacekeeping and the tasks of combat forces in a crisis management context, including the restoration of peace, are linked to the EU agreement.²⁹

The EU's efforts to develop a crisis management capability of its own assumed concrete form at the meeting of the European Council in Cologne on 3rd-4th June 1999. This meeting restricted the de-

velopment of a common security and defence system very definitely to crisis management and the above-mentioned Petersberg Obligations, and was of the opinion that the EU should be capable of acting independently to prevent conflicts and react to crises. In order to do this, it would need credible military power, means of taking the necessary decisions and a readiness to deploy its troops in order to resolve international crises, although without interfering with the activities of NATO in this respect.³⁰

The European Council meeting in Cologne authorized Finland to work on all these security aspects in the course of its presidency of the EU, bearing in mind that one part of the security package was to consist of the member states' non-military crisis management capabilities. In accordance with this resolution, a process of constructing an inventory of all the resources available within the EU was set in motion during the Finnish presidency, leading to the publication of a catalogue of these resources.³¹ The conclusion to be drawn from this was that the EU had accumulated a vast amount of experience in civilian operations connected with crisis management, the main areas involved in which were the supplying of humanitarian assistance, the normalization of administrative and judicial functions, search and rescue services and the supervision of elections and human rights.³²

The European Council meeting in Helsinki drew up a plan of action for developing civilian branches to take part in crisis management operations and for facilitating their mobilization, based on improvements in the combined deployment of national, community-based and non-governmental organizations and in their readiness to react to crisis situations. The most urgent measures to be taken were the formation of a resource database, mapping of the opportunities for developing the state of readiness of civilian police forces and the creation of rapid financing mechanisms. The above guidelines were consistent with UN peacekeeping activities and the Brahimi Report on the development of these, since the latter also laid emphasis on the strengthening of civilian police forces and the creation of financing mechanisms capable of reacting to the initiation of a new operation and the needs arising in the course of it.³³

Practical experience has shown that there was a distinct need for developmental work of that kind. Colonel Arto Rätty, commander of the Finnish KFOR troops in 2000, observed, for instance, that there were clear deficiencies in the activities pursued by the EU in

Kosovo, in that decision-making processes were too cumbersome and slow and the ways of working were unable to adapt to demanding crisis management situations. The problems, he believed, were not so much military ones as matters of political decision-making and administration. Similarly the financial mechanisms available to the EU were incapable of channelling funds to targets in crisis areas with sufficient rapidity.³⁴

On the basis of the decisions reached at the Helsinki meeting, the EU resolved in May 2000 to set up a Civilian Crisis Management Committee to function as a working group responsible to the Council of the EU. The purpose of this committee was to gather information, make recommendations and give advice on civilian crisis management to the Political and Security Affairs Committee and other relevant council bodies.³⁵

New results regarding the organization of military and non-military crisis management functions were achieved at the European Council meeting at Santa Maria da Feira on 19th and 20th June 2000, when a firm intention was announced to increase the preparedness and efficiency of the EU's means of reacting to crises in the civilian as well as the military sector, with the idea that this increased efficiency could be placed at the disposal of a leading world organization such as the UN or the OSCE, or else serve as an independent instrument of the EU. It was essential to increase the resources available in all branches of civilian crisis management, although particular attention was to be paid to branches in which the international community was still experiencing deficiencies. The chief focal points in civilian crisis management identified at that meeting were police activities, actions aimed at strengthening the civilian administration and the rule of law, and rescue services.³⁶ This meant that the policies and initiatives outlined in Helsinki had now taken concrete shape and the council was requiring member states from that point onwards to take action to implement the general objectives and resource targets laid down with respect to crisis management, although it was always to be remembered that participation in crisis management was voluntary for each member state.³⁷

In February 2001 a rapid action system was set up by the European Commission to enable the EU to obtain funds quickly for a crisis management operation. The system can be implemented at once if the beneficiary is experiencing a situation that poses a threat to general security, personal security or the stability of the country as

a whole. The assistance is of a short-term nature and not subject to repayment, and is intended to cover all aspects except for those that come under the jurisdiction of the Humanitarian Office (ECHO). It was through this system that the EU was able to finance its CIMIC activities in Afghanistan, for instance.³⁸ It can also be used to rectify defects of the kind that were observed in the EU operation in Kosovo in its early stages.

The division of EU crisis management into military and civilian branches of activity, excluding preventive measures,³⁹ is displayed in Figure 3. The range of measures available in this scheme is intended to enable an adequate response to be made to any situation in which diplomacy has proved insufficient for ensuring stability in the area concerned. The diagram points to a distinct deficiency in coordination between the activities of the civilian and military components, suggesting that efforts should be made at once to create a coordinative mechanism at this point that is capable of functioning at all levels in an operation.

In the opinion of Antti Sierla, Counsellor at the Finnish Legation, the choice of focal points was influenced by the fact that rescue services were already well developed and their activities concentrat-



Figure 3. Division of crisis management within the EU.

ed under UN control, which made it possible to begin the planning work at once, and an operative model was already in existence. The need for a civilian police force in Kosovo, on the other hand, was something that emerged more strongly as the operation proceeded, and the choice of this focal point was influenced by the many difficulties that the international community had faced in setting up such a force. Support for the development of the judiciary was naturally closely connected with policing, and the development of a civilian administration could also be seen, in Sierla's view, as a logical continuation of the same line of thinking.⁴⁰

It is worth noting in relation to Sierla's statement that the focal points of crisis management defined by the EU have arisen out of existing needs and assumptions regarding the capacity to respond to future crises, and have been influenced by the fact that the member states already have the experience and trained personnel necessary for initiating such activities. The main problem that can be envisaged is that of ensuring that a sufficient number of people can be mobilized according to a rapid timetable.

The balanced development of military and civilian resources will be essential for effective crisis management in the EU, and this will call for close coordination of all the EU's available means and equipment, both military and civilian, at all levels of activity.⁴¹

Policing

The EU member states have noted the important role played by civilian policing in the crisis management operations in the Balkans, and are of the opinion that particular emphasis should be placed on the training of local police forces in future operations, as this would make it possible to reduce the sizes of international police forces and the lengths of time for which individual policemen were drafted into such areas.⁴²

Police activities in a crisis management operation comprise full-scale local policing duties in addition to the traditional supervisory, educational and advisory tasks. The international police force in Kosovo, for example, found itself having to perform routine local policing duties in the early stages of the operation, including the maintenance of order and security, crime investigation, traffic control and border duties. Preparations for future challenges are likely to involve the selection and training of a large number of policemen from the

police reserves beforehand,⁴³ and also the recognition that the police in certain member states have greater experience in certain fields than those of others. This is particularly true of crowd control, for example.

The intention is that the police reserves set aside for future EU crisis management duties should comprise sufficiently strong voluntary groups of professionals in different fields who are capable of cooperation with other actors, the aim being that the EU should be able by 2003 to assign a force of up to 5000 police to an international operation in response to a request from an international organization such as the UN or OSCE and to have the first 1000 assembled and ready for action within 30 days. These forces could also be detailed to an independent police operation as part of a more extensive EU crisis management intervention.⁴⁴

The EU's plans for developing civilian police activities in response to crisis management needs are similar in outline to those set out in the Brahimi Report published by the UN in August 2000, which encouraged member states to contribute towards the formation of a sufficiently strong police reserve. The report emphasized the importance of regional arrangements for staff training, definition of the necessary capability level and despatch of the force to the site of the operation, for example, in order to achieve the necessary speed of reaction.⁴⁵

The EU civilian police initiative assumed concrete form with the initiation of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia on 1st January 2003, taking over from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF). The EUPM operation involves 500 policemen from the 15 EU member states and 18 other countries. The intention is to continue the work of the IPTF in accordance with the general provisions of the Dayton Accord for establishing a police service in the area that conforms to the best European and international criteria.⁴⁶

Strengthening of the rule of law

A successful outcome for a police operation will require of the EU an ability to assist the target country in reforming or reconstituting its system of justice and penal institutions. A crisis can easily lead to collapse of the rule of law, growth in organized crime and corruption in society at large, and this poses serious challenges for the community in its efforts at recovery.⁴⁷

The Feira resolution of the European Council permits member states to create national systems for selecting and mobilizing judges, prosecutors and prison service advisors at short notice for participation in peacekeeping operations. As an organization, the EU will attempt to lay down guidelines for the selection and training of judges and penal advisors for international duties in collaboration with the UN and regional organizations, particularly the OSCE. The EU can also take direct action to promote the creation or reform of the infrastructures of local courts and prisons, and it is also willing to employ trained local people in such operations.⁴⁸

The EU has begun to compile a register of experts in the strengthening of the rule of law. The initial stage has been largely a matter of surveying the possibilities for this, and practical work is not yet at the same level as in the case of policing, partly on account of the considerable experience that the member states already had with policing as a part of peacekeeping operations, whereas no such experience existed in the judicial sphere.

In October 2000 the EU arranged a seminar on "Strengthening of the rule of law in crisis management - concrete goals for the European Union", at which a preliminary exchange of information took place between the EU, UN, OSCE and Council of Europe in four spheres: 1) concrete experiences, 2) conclusions and future prospects, 3) viewpoints and procedures regarding a framework for justice, and 4) questions of added value.⁴⁹

A seminar of this kind that involves the main organizations functioning within a certain field can have the effect of increasing the resources available, but it should be noted that in this case none of the organizations concerned have any broad-based experience of practical work in the field. The people with experience were those who had carried out such work in the service of more specialized organizations, and even then the exploitation of these events and measures at a later date was dependent on the existence of proper documentation, involving clear descriptions of the situation, the effects of the environment, the measures taken and the results achieved. In this respect a well-defined archiving system can be decisive, as those working in the field within a certain operation are frequently there only for a limited length of time and in the service of one particular organization.

Andrew Fyfe, deputy director of the Tuzla area in Bosnia for the OSCE, called particular attention to the personnel structures of the

various organizations and the changes in these in the course of the operation, taking his own organization as an example. At the beginning of the operation the various organizations did not necessarily have real professionals available, mainly on account of the difficult and often dangerous working conditions, but instead they had a high proportion of former soldiers who had training in survival under difficult conditions. As the situation developed, however, and conditions were normalized, the personnel structures of the organizations active in the Balkans became more heavily angled towards civil servants.⁵⁰

Strengthening of the civilian administration

Although it has not yet been defined within the European Union precisely what the strengthening of a civil administration entails, it is stated in EU publications that the reconstruction phase after a crisis should include support for the country's civilian administration. Member states have been asked to consider their possibilities for sending experts to crisis areas to train and reconstitute the administration there.⁵¹

The reorganization and training of local and regional administrations in areas that have suffered crises is a major challenge. The problems may lie in inadequate social and health services, for instance, and there may also be a serious refugee situation. In cases where the whole administration of the crisis area has collapsed it may be that an international organization has to take responsibility for all aspects of the administration at first. This cannot be a viable long-term alternative, however, if the aim is to seek a comprehensive solution to the crisis, as responsibility has to be transferred to the local administration at the earliest possible juncture, once real training has been provided and the necessary reorganizations completed.⁵²

The measures required for planning and preparing the strengthening of the civilian administration can serve in a sense as a test of the efficiency of the EU, as no extensive preparatory work of this kind has been undertaken by any major organization previously. The people working on this need to be familiar with all aspects of the functioning of the civilian component, because all other areas of activity affect this either directly or indirectly.

The reorganization of the provincial level of administration in Finland, for instance, has released a group of professionals who would

be available for operations of this kind in the future, and it would be important to look into who these people are and whether they would be interested in international duties in the future. They will scarcely have had any experience of crisis management operations as part of the international community previously, of course, and therefore their use for this purpose would inevitably involve a certain amount of additional training.⁵³

Civil Protection

Disaster relief operations entail a range of search and rescue services, the functionality of which must, according to the Feira resolution, be ensured through reliance on the rescue services, equipment and resources of individual countries.⁵⁴ These are naturally needs that can arise very suddenly and should be kept separate from the corresponding functions that belong to the sphere of military rescue operations.⁵⁵

It is possible that rescue operations may have to be carried out in an area where the international community and all the elements involved in it are already working, in which case the present heading covers largely individual instances dealt with using systems that are already in existence, on the strength of regional and bilateral agreements.⁵⁶ One example of rescue services that can be quoted here concerns the 2002 earthquake in Afghanistan, in connection with which the ISAF troops were used to deal with the disaster, include the transportation and care of the injured.⁵⁷

Participation in rescue and humanitarian aid operations mounted by various organizations and systems must always be based on a decision made by the government of the country concerned or other responsible authorities. In the case of Finland, for instance, it is a question of whether we are committed to international cooperation in actual operations as well as attendance at meetings and participation in training.⁵⁸

A mechanism for cooperation and mutual assistance has already been created within the EU itself to cope with accidents and natural disasters, entailing the maintenance of an around-the-clock emergency system within the EU and a corresponding service point in each member country. The Commission has also drawn up a handbook containing information on the resources available to the rescue services in each country. It has been observed in the light of

recent experiences, however, that more needs to be done to develop this system, particularly with respect to defining which country is to lead each operation and which rescue services each is to specialize in.⁵⁹

2.2 Experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo

Where the focuses of attention in civilian crisis management discussed earlier in this chapter have been based on those defined by the EU, it must be said here that experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo have shown that these are not by any means the only factors to be considered when preparing for future non-military crisis management work. We will therefore concern ourselves here with areas of activity that have particularly come to the fore in the Balkans operations, one purpose being to provide as comprehensive a picture as possible of the overall field of crisis management. There are some areas, of course, in which we still do not have very much experience, and this will be reflected in the content of the discussion at such points. At the same time, however, the division of the field used here can be regarded as a frame of reference for all the tasks that could possibly be assigned to the civilian components in a CIMIC context.

When examining the activities of the various organizations, one notices that they tend to define certain focal points for themselves and develop their own resources in accordance with these, possibly in response to earlier experiences, the availability of personnel or visibility. The activities of certain states may be prompted by the favourable image or financial profit to be gained in given fields. The desire of states to assert influence over their own spheres of economic interest can also be expected to emerge as a decisive motive in the future.

From a military point of view, civilian crisis management can be regarded as providing support for the military effort and enabling some savings in terms of resources. It is important for a peacekeeping force to be aware of the fields involved in non-military activity, what organizations are usually responsible for it, what principles govern their actions and how the military wing can prepare to lend support to the various actors forming the civilian component of a crisis management operation.

Where military organizations are set up to take responsibility

for certain defined aspects of crisis management operations, they have only limited resources available for civilian crisis management, although they may have “dual use” resources in abundance. Similarly the attitude of the troops towards non-military activities may be one that tends to magnify these resources or detract from them.⁶⁰

The following aspects of civilian crisis management that can be divided off as functional entities of their own are:

- restoration of the social order
- development of democracy and administration
- promotion of economic recovery
- revival of social and health services
- improvement of the general infrastructure
- stimulation of culture and education,
- establishment of external relations
- civil defence.
- boundary patrolling and customs
- civil protection
- refugees and displaced persons

Questions such as the establishment of external relations, civil protection, boundary patrolling and customs will not be dealt with here.

Restoration of the social order

It has been shown in practice that restoration of the social order is one of the most important factors in civilian crisis management if one is aiming at a satisfactory general outcome. The subdivision of this theme may be taken to be development of the judiciary, policing and the prison service, restoration of law and order, crime investigation and the apprehension of criminals, implementation of international justice and the restoration of human rights.⁶¹ All these may be regarded as contributing towards peaceful development in other fields of civilian government, too.

The restoration of social order calls for a sufficiently rapid response from the international community. A sufficiently strong police force has to be assigned to the area as soon as conditions permit, with priorities for action determined according to the situation. Their most important task is to provide safe living conditions for the local population and to prevent illegal actions that are likely to prove a threat to general security. Activities can be put in motion through

cooperation between the military and civilian components, although in order to guarantee a favourable outcome it is essential to create as soon as possible conditions under which the responsibility for people's basic security lies with the local authorities.

The bodies responsible for measures connected with the restoration of social order usually belong to the UN or its system, or else they are formed by it to act in particular instances,⁶² but regional organizations such as the OSCE can adopt an major role in this, and it is possible where necessary to form independent investigatory groups composed for the most part of professionals in different fields sent by their particular countries. Thus the countries contributing resources form significant participants in the whole civilian crisis management operation.⁶³

At the national level, the duties to be performed comprise measures that are directed at serving the interests of the whole system, and they are characteristically of a long-term nature, as attempts are made to ensure effects that will last well into the future. The duties as such may be a matter of passing laws or statutes, training local officials and developing working conditions. The measures needed at the regional and local levels are generally concrete in nature and for the most part have an immediate impact, e.g. crime investigation, the maintenance of law and order and the training and supervision of local police forces.⁶⁴

Development of democracy and administration

All measures aimed at promoting the internal development of the state are subsumed under this heading. The objective should be for the state to meet all the (generally accepted) criteria for a democratic community, the subheadings which support the achievement of this objective being the formation of local, regional and national administrations, the implementation of democracy through legally valid elections, the provision of adequate education in democracy, the creation of adequate conditions for democratic actions as circumstances require and unbiased supervision of the enactment of the above measures. The creation of suitable conditions for normal political life, in which the representatives of minorities also have a say in decisions at the national level and the majority takes account of the opinions of the opposition, also belongs to the development of democracy.⁶⁵

Supervision of the armed forces of the parties engaged in the

conflict can also be included as one aspect of the development of democracy. This is normally looked after by the military component in the early stages of an operation, but the normal procedure is to undertake a reorganization of duties following a reduction in the number of troops placed in the area so that these armed groups are able in the future to defend their own areas but do not pose a threat to their neighbours.⁶⁶

The development of administration and democracy is one of the most difficult areas of civilian crisis management to implement successfully. The war that has been waged and its immediate consequences will frequently have given rise to conditions in which the population is divided into factions, and this makes it more difficult to normalize the administration and achieve democracy, while all actions may be coloured further by biased attitudes adopted by internationally significant states and groupings towards the parties engaged in the crisis and towards the kind of solution to be aimed at.⁶⁷

The main organizations that are in a position to implement measures connected with the development of administration and democracy are the UN and widely accepted regional organizations such as the OSCE, although it is also possible to make use of various observer organizations. One such body that functioned in Bosnia was the European Commission Monitory Mission (ECMM), with the task of reporting to the EU on developments in the area. An organization can influence the implementation of democracy through the impact that its reports have on the areal assignment of resources. Supervision of the armed forces of the country in question at the initial stage in the operation is usually in the hands of the international military organization, but responsibility is usually transferred later to the OSCE in the case of operations in Europe.⁶⁸

Promotion of economic recovery

One consequence of a long-term conflict of the kind experienced in Bosnia is that the economic life of the area collapses almost entirely, typically through the virtual destruction of all factories and comparable elements of the economic infrastructure. Another characteristic feature of the period following such a crisis is the occurrence of mass unemployment.⁶⁹

The concept of economic recovery subsumes all measures taken to enable the affected state to function in the future without sig-

nificant external economic assistance, including the development of financial institutions, the planning of the necessary arrangements for financing large-scale projects and the guiding of everyday commercial life by ensuring adequate education and supervision. Support is often needed for the creation of jobs, activation of commercial life and development of a taxation system. As conditions become more stable, support can be considered for primary production and small-scale industries, in the form of various loans for entrepreneurs.⁷⁰

Economic development needs to proceed in close interaction with the development of administration and democracy, for without a smoothly functioning administrative system and associated direction at the national level, it is impossible to create a functional economic system. In addition, features such as corruption, smuggling and other forms of crime can interfere with the initiation of such functions.⁷¹ Thus reconstruction can be attempted in all areas of life only when the international community has succeeded through its own measures in ensuring that the assistance provided and the resources allotted for various purposes are being used in the preordained manner.

Responsibility for economic recovery can be assumed by any organization that has sufficient resources for this, both financially and in terms of personnel, e.g. the UN or the EU. The World Bank may also have a major role in organizing the necessary finance, and the participant states' own overseas development funds, e.g. the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), can similarly play a significant part.⁷²

One integral part of this activity is determination of the level aimed at in the measures to be planned and implemented, which should correspond to the level of development achieved by society in the area prior to the conflict. Attention also needs to be paid to the expected duration of such activities, which will be affected above all by the country's own resources, e.g. raw materials and skilled labour force.⁷³

Revival of social and health services

Of all the areas of civilian crisis management it is this that is most obviously of a dual nature, as it consists in the initial phase of surveying the need for emergency help and the provision of this help.

At the same time it is necessary to be able to define the resources available in the area in terms of both staff and materials and to identify the areas that are in need of immediate help.⁷⁴

The development of effective social and health services for a country or countries recovering from war calls for the establishment of evaluatory and developmental groups of various kinds. In the case of an internal conflict within a single country, it is seldom possible to make use directly of the structures of the old system, if only because hospitals and other facilities in the territory of one party to the conflict cannot be used in the initial stage to treat representatives of the other party.⁷⁵

The finance available for the initial stage usually takes the form of donations channelled into the crisis area through an international organization, the most notable of these being the International Red Cross.⁷⁶ Various voluntary organizations also play a prominent role at this stage.⁷⁷

More long-term development of social and health services for a crisis area is usually entrusted to UN agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO), often working in conjunction with international non-governmental organizations. Others can support the cause through individual projects of their own⁷⁸

The key element at the local level in the initial stage is the coordination of aid and confirmation that it is reaching its destination, together with the maintenance of essential functions such as first aid and ambulance services, although responsibility for the latter should be transferred at the earliest possible juncture to the appropriate local authorities, after assurances that they are able to discharge such responsibilities.⁷⁹

Improvement of the general infrastructure

Subsumed under this heading are all the measures that are aimed at restoring the functional capacity of parts of the physical environment and providing the conditions necessary for the development of production and economic activity. These include industrial establishments, components of the agricultural system, telecommunications and the network of roads, airports and harbours. This forms an extremely broad field of civilian crisis management, and successful accomplishment of the tasks involved calls for comprehensive planning based on a thorough survey of the prevailing situation. It is also

important from the point of view of the whole operation that these activities should be closely related to the promotion of economic life, at least as far as the assignment of resources is concerned.⁸⁰

Good road coverage, operative airports and well-functioning telecommunications are essential to the work of the international community, and if this community is required to create an infrastructure of its own in any of these respects, every effort should be made to do this in such a way that the resulting facilities can be incorporated into the planned system at a later stage.⁸¹

The measures to be taken at the regional or national level usually concern whole systems or large individual installations, such as the construction or repair of airports, harbours or large factories. At the local level the measures are frequently more in the nature of microprojects, but it should also be possible to link these in with larger entities, implying that actors engaged at different levels should be capable of mutually coordinating and planning their activities.⁸²

It is necessary to take the main problems experienced in the area into account when planning the development of the overall infrastructure. If the aim is to allow displaced persons to return home, provision has to be made for this, and if there are defects in essential services such as transport or electricity or water supplies, it has to be recognised that these will cause major problems. Again the solving of such problems calls for coordination and the combining of resources among actors at different levels.

The organization responsible for overall development of the infrastructure is usually the UN, but the EU adopted a significant role in this in the case of the operations in the Balkans and has also emerged as a major financier of reconstruction projects. Individual states have also provided considerable amounts of finance, however, as exemplified by the water supply projects financed and implemented by the Finnish government in Bosnia.⁸³

Civil Defence

This is usually taken to cover all the measures that a state plans and takes to ensure the protection of its citizens from dangers of various kinds, e.g. military threats, environmental hazards, major catastrophes or spin-offs from crises occurring elsewhere. The measures concerned may include:

- propagation of human rights and the rights of given population

- groups under conditions of war
- readiness of the civilian authorities to react to emergencies
 - organization of civil defence leadership
 - warning and alarm systems
 - civil defence activities
 - evacuation plans
 - organization, training and equipping of civilian formations
 - citizens' advice and training
 - emergency supplies
 - preparation for the repair of the community infrastructure and essential services and the maintenance of service functions under exceptional conditions.⁸⁴

Independent states are responsible for their own civil defence arrangements, but if these systems have collapsed as a result of a crisis, it is possible that an outside organization may have to take responsibility for protecting the population. Finland, for example, is prepared to provide support of this kind in crisis areas through the UN, EU or NATO and to consider providing such assistance in individual cases of a request from a foreign government. The achievement of a level of preparedness for providing such assistance in a crisis area is a long-term process and involves the acquisition of equipment etc. that may not necessarily be of any use in the case of a major catastrophe at home, for instance.⁸⁵

Refugees and displaced persons

A refugee is a person who is being or is likely to be persecuted on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group and has therefore been forced to leave his or her own country. It is frequently impossible to return because the authorities in that country are unable to guarantee that person's safety.⁸⁶

A displaced person (DP), sometimes referred to as an internal displaced person (IDP), is a person who has had to leave his or her home area on the same grounds as a refugee but has remained within the same country, usually moving to an area where the majority of the population is of the same ethnic background.⁸⁷

Some of the salient questions in the Bosnia operations, and to some extent also in those in Kosovo, were problems affecting refu-

gees and displaced persons. The 1995 agreement in Bosnia, for instance, required local authorities to support minorities in their attempts to return to their home areas, e.g. by ensuring that they could do so in safety, and the international community has also focused its activities to a great extent on enabling refugees to return home, but in spite of all these efforts, the numbers returning have fallen well short of the targets.⁸⁸

Responsibility for refugees and displaced persons lies with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who usually engages the help of other international organizations, rather in the manner of subcontractors.⁸⁹ The local authorities also play a major role in this work, however, for it is in the last resort through their efforts that suitable conditions are created for solving the problems of refugees and displaced persons.

The factors preventing the return of refugees may be continued reprisals by the opposite side in the dispute, the destruction of their dwellings, future economic uncertainties or the achievement of a better standard of living in their country of exile. Successful repatriation calls for attention to be paid to the solution of all these problems.⁹⁰

2.3 Conclusions

Civilian crisis management is a question of a third party intervening to resolve a crisis and normalize conditions in the country concerned. It always entails a strong political steering component.

Temporal factors are of great importance here. The reaction time required in the case of a major natural catastrophe is a matter of hours or a few days at the most, while in the case of war it is essential to be able to begin reconstructing society and ensuring the basic rights of the people immediately a peace treaty has been signed, as this can often prevent a resumption of hostilities.

The time available for reconstruction after a war is limited to a few years, while other restrictions exist in terms of personnel and finance. It must not be forgotten, too, that the availability of resources can be altered fundamentally by changes in the political climate in the countries participating in the crisis management operation.

No firm opinion has yet been expressed in discussions on civil-

ian crisis management regarding the duration of such operations and for how long given organizations should be committed to them, although the time factor has been mentioned in discussions on the exclusion of development aid from the sphere of civilian crisis management. Bilateral development aid is by nature a long-term undertaking, and it is not regarded as forming a part of crisis management. On the other hand, experiences in the Balkans suggest that even crisis management can call for long-term commitment.

It is essential to take the conditions prevailing in the area of operation into account when training crisis management personnel. The starting point is that the people working there should be familiar with the tasks involved, but emphasis needs to be placed above all on the special features of the area itself. In other words, it is necessary to pay attention to the ability of the specialized staff to work in a certain operational environment.

A comprehensive picture has not yet emerged of the whole field of civilian crisis management. It is known to be composed of certain sub-fields, so that the measures taken in each tend to affect the others, but the interfaces between these have not been clearly defined. This means that there is an obvious need for planning that takes the whole operation into account. The particular features of the crisis that emerge dictate what methods are to be employed in each case, and this calls for broad-based preparatory work geared towards facing highly differing tasks. Good operating conditions under such circumstance entail systems that permit the rapid deployment of staff and sufficiently prompt arrangement of the necessary finance.

The European Union is still at the beginning of its task of developing a capability for civilian crisis management, and it is not yet realistic to expect it to be able to respond in the same manner as the UN, for instance. It has excellent prospects of being to develop such a non-military capability, however. The crucial question is the attitude of the member countries, for they are in effect the providers of the resources. It is not reasonable for the EU to operate on a principle of "everyone supplies everything", but rather the EU should attempt to divide the focal points between its members, as should be quite possible once the process of cataloguing the resources available has been completed. It should then be possible to observe the same principles in the assembly of resources as in the areas of military specialization, where the member countries have indicated the types of troops that they have more experience in providing than

other countries do, e.g. the Finnish CIMIC company.

The EU is engaged in constructing for itself a set of instruments by which it will be able to react to possible disturbances in the social order. Attention should be paid at the planning stage to facilitating coordination between the various elements by forming units with a satisfactory functional capacity, as experience suggests that one major barrier to successful action is a lack of coordination mechanisms. If due attention is paid to the interfaces between areas of activity at the planning stage and to the necessity for measures designed to link them, it will be possible to increase their combined impact.

Up to now the European Union has not been sufficiently good at predicting future problems and challenges. Instead, planning and preparation have consistently lagged a step behind the true situation. For instance, by concentrating on acquiring police reserves of the kind that would have been necessary for dealing with the problems that emerged at the early stages in Kosovo, the EU prevented itself from preparing to deal with the subsequent situation, in which the need was for a group of international observers. Its planning needs to be capable of addressing simultaneously the needs of a possible new operation and future developments in existing ones. This would create the conditions necessary for the systematic development of international forces and at the same time would have the effect of reducing the duration of individual operations, which should be the eventual goal of crisis management as far as the nations contributing troops are concerned.

The list of areas contributing to civilian crisis management presented here on the basis of existing operations is a long one and represents only in part the areas of focus defined by the EU. The staff of a military detachment engaged in preparing for an operation should be capable of determining in advance the particular areas which are likely to be involved in each case, whereupon it should be possible to list the types of professional that will be needed in order for the military organization to accomplish its objectives. A good example of this arose in Kosovo, where the military had to take responsibility for civilian policing work in the initial stages.

The military organization needs to follow closely what is happening in the sphere of civilian crisis management, and needs to have sufficient grounds when proposing CIMIC collaboration, e.g. an adequate knowledge of the other party's mode of organization and ways of working. Mutual awareness of this kind can be promot-

ed by means of courses in which representatives of the military and civilian components explain their activities to each other. This should also make it possible to plan joint actions that take the needs and ways of working of both sides into account. Courses of this kind should be planned on the case study principle, which would require the creation of a realistic practice situation. This would enable real planning to take place in which the areas of responsibility would be clearly delimited. Sufficiently broad-based descriptions of the objectives and ways of working of the various actors involved would need to be produced for these teaching situations, and such background information would need to be distributed to all the participants beforehand.

Where a military organization is capable of moving into a crisis area quickly, experience suggests that the units available for civilian crisis management purposes do not usually have this capacity. Consequently, the possibility should be explored at the national level of delegating certain experts to the military organization in fields regarded as important as far as the whole operation is concerned. If the area of operation lacks a functional administration, for example, positions for experts in this field could be opened up in the military detachment, the occupants of which would be responsible for the initial planning and perhaps for setting the measures that they regard as most important in motion. Once the civilian component was drafted into the area the same persons could be freely recruited into the appropriate organizations to continue their work. Such an arrangement could confer significant advantages both on the military organization, which would have experts at its disposal, and on the civilian organization, which would gain an intelligence and preparatory unit.

3 FUNDAMENTALS OF CIMIC

3.1 NATO

NATO is best known as a military organization dedicated to maintaining the freedom and security of its member countries in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. It is intended to serve as a deterrent and means of defence against aggression shown towards member countries, and is regarded by its members primarily as a political entity, and at the same time as the world's most effective multinational military organization.⁹¹

NATO has a significant role in security within Europe, and has adapted to the changes that have taken place within the continent by developing its strategic doctrine and military defence systems. The principal perceived threat during the Cold War era was a massive Soviet and Warsaw Pact offensive, and now that such a threat no longer exists and the new dangers are likely to arise from ethnic, religious and regional crises, uncontrolled migratory flows and environmental disasters, the alliance itself has regrouped its forces into more mobile units.⁹²

The new outline strategy, or mission, for NATO, approved in April 1999, has caused it to be committed more firmly than ever to crisis management. The guidelines are the transatlantic link and a broad concept of security. Maintenance of the freedom and security of member countries is still one of its basic tasks,⁹³ but it is now recognised that the probability of a wide-scale conventional war has diminished, although it has not been eliminated entirely.⁹⁴

The attempts to define crisis management objectives more precisely on the part of NATO are quite easy to understand in view of the operating environment for which the new strategy was drawn up, since the NATO commitment to the Balkans area, in both Bosnia and Kosovo, was a concrete issue of the day, but in any case the alliance's leading role in the implementation of crisis management operations has been undeniable in recent times, as it is the only organization with the potential for mounting peacekeeping operations of this new type. By accepting responsibility for operations of the kind that are taking place in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO has at the same time strengthened its own position in Europe and above all underlined its utility in the eyes of member countries.⁹⁵

The new Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine (AJP-9) published by NATO in August 2000 is based on document MC 411 (Civil Military Relations), which is concerned with cooperation largely on the strategic level, while itself dealing with the operational level. AJP-9 has gained its present form mostly as a consequence of experiences gained in the Bosnia operation, four earlier drafts having been published between 1997 and 2000 before the ratified version came out. The most recent version, published in the regulations of June 2001, scarcely differs in content in any way from the 2000 version. The doctrine has been drawn up to detail measures that can be taken both in operations provided for under Article 5 and ones that do not belong under this article, and thus the main emphasis is on CIMIC support for military operations, which is regarded as vital for the alliance's troops when operating outside their own geographical area.⁹⁶

It has transpired in practice that the focus of CIMIC activities at an early stage in an operation will inevitably be on support for its own troops, but that the focus may change as the operation advances, more attention being devoted to tasks that are necessary for achieving the overall objectives of the mission. This transfer of emphasis may also be a function of the conditions that prevailed at the beginning of the operation. In Kosovo, for example, the CIMIC personnel had to direct a substantial proportion of their resources initially towards maintaining the basic functions of the local communities. Such shifts in the focus of activities are not allowed for in the existing NATO CIMIC doctrine, however, partly because the question of recognising phases in an operation has not been explored in sufficient detail.⁹⁷

The new doctrine also considers cooperation with other international organizations and with the local population. Mention is similarly made of community reconstruction needs, but the significance of this aspect for reducing the duration of a military presence is not noted.⁹⁸

A frame of reference for CIMIC activity on the part of NATO is provided by the assumption that the commander of the military forces in an operation, whether subject to Article 5 or not, will need to take account of broader social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian considerations when planning and implementing his strategies. CIMIC is not a new phenomenon in NATO circles, however. It is simply that it was looked on previously

as more of a logistic challenge for an operation, e.g. as a matter of making use of the resources of the area in support of the operation's own troops.⁹⁹

CIMIC is now understood specifically as an attempt to strengthen measures that can make it possible to create conditions in the crisis area that are conducive to peaceful development. In order to achieve this, the doctrine maintains that personnel in this field should:

- organize platforms for cooperation with civilian components at all levels (local, regional and national)
- participate in joint planning at both the strategic and operative level together with the principal civilian organizations before and during the operation
- monitor the local community constantly in order to identify deficiencies and plan how to remedy them
- supervise those of the operation's own functions that are intimately bound up with the local community, e.g. the use of local labour
- work in such a manner that actors in the international community can pass over responsibility for the maintenance of social functions smoothly to the local authorities
- represent the viewpoint of their own field of activity in the planning of military activities
- advise the commander of the operation's own troops on all the above matters.¹⁰⁰

The regulations divide CIMIC into the follow sub-areas: Civil-Military Liason (CML), Support to the Civil Environment (SCE), and Support to the Force (STF).¹⁰¹ These three sub-areas share the common feature of emphasising the legitimacy of the military operations and committing civil society to participation in a process aimed at the normalization of conditions. The main measures available for achieving this are active dissemination of information and close cooperation with the local authorities and leaders in society.¹⁰² Properly timed, active dissemination of information can do much to improve the impact of measures on the group at which they are aimed.

The implementation of CIMIC measures calls for three components:

- acceptance of a principle of action and a policy, or doctrine, which can also be understood as implying the existence of adequate documentation to back up the operation

- ability to act in accordance with the principles of action and policy or doctrine, which calls for appropriate trained personnel
- units formed on a functional basis and supported with adequate resources.¹⁰³

A CIMIC organization should comprise trained personnel, specialists in particular fields and actual resources. Although the NATO organization has a specialization element, this does not have the necessary staffing capacity for such a purpose, and organizations have been assembled in practice from the personnel resources that happen to have been available. There are also differences between member states in the composition of their military organizations, mostly on account of differences of opinion over the activities to be pursued arising from experiences with earlier UN peacekeeping missions, for instance. In some cases forces that base their composition on the use of reserves are likely to look on CIMIC differently from those that use professional soldiers, as an army of reserves tends to have more experientially based knowledge and skills relevant to cooperation with civilians.¹⁰⁴

CIMIC staff are required to work predominantly in an environment in which their collaboration partners are local civilians and representatives of international organizations working in the area, which calls for a knowledge of local conditions and the history of the area. Working with the representatives of civilian organizations also requires an adequate knowledge of these bodies' methods and ways of working, and also adequate language skills, as the ability to communicate without an interpreter is a distinct advantage in liaison situations.¹⁰⁵

The principles of CIMIC are in effect guidelines that remain in force for the duration of an operation, and can be divided into two categories: 1) regulations governing activities within the military organization, and 2) principles governing collaboration between the military and civilians.¹⁰⁶ The former apply to planning processes among the troops, and should ideally be determined on an operation-centred and commander-centred basis, as is typical of United States military operations.¹⁰⁷

CIMIC activities also include tasks at the operational and tactical levels, which are the same regardless of whether the operation falls under Article 5 or not. These can be grouped temporally into those applying to the time preceding the operation, those to be exe-

cuted during the operation and those connected with withdrawal from the operation.¹⁰⁸ According to NATO's CIMIC doctrine, one major aspect of the tasks to be performed prior to an operation concerns training of the troops, i.e. their preparation for taking maximally effective action in the area of the future operation. Closely connected with this is the provision of support for the commander of the troops, e.g. ensuring that he is aware of the possible influence of civil society on his own actions. The CIMIC personnel will be expected to draw up a section on CIMIC activity for the operational order (usually appendix W), which should contain a detailed account of social conditions in the area, itemized as follows:

- political and cultural history,
- functioning of the national and regional administration,
- public administration and the services that it provides,
- economics
- problems among the civilian population (employment, incomes etc.)
- migration among the population (refugees, displaced persons etc.)
- purpose and functional capacity of organizations and other civilian bodies with a mandate to be in the area
- the media.¹⁰⁹

It may be noted from experience that the above list usually forms only part of the CIMIC appendix attached to the operation order. These items are concerned mostly with environmental conditions and their impact on the operation, whereas the most important parts of the appendix, those concerned with the requirements set for the operation by the supreme command and the principles for implementing them, are omitted from the list in the CIMIC doctrine. Thus the list serves more as an outline for a report on local conditions than as a basis for the CIMIC section of the operation order.¹¹⁰

Cooperation between a military organization and civilian actors is regarded in the NATO doctrine as being grounded in five functional entities:

- regular meetings
- a two-way flow of information
- coordination of activities
- implementation of practical CIMIC measures
- continuous appraisal of the situation.¹¹¹

The most demanding of the above entities is the implementation of practical CIMIC measures, a reference to situations in which a branch of an operation may have to accept responsibility for some aspect of society because the civilian organization lacks the capability to take charge of it immediately. Instructions should be drawn up at the planning stage regarding the role that the military organization can adopt with respect to civilian areas of responsibility in a situation in which the civilian organization possessing the mandate has not yet arrived in the area or cannot accept the tasks designated to it. This would enable implementation to take place on the same principles throughout the area covered by the operation.¹¹²

When the military organization is beginning its withdrawal from the area CIMIC activity is required to transfer the non-military functions for which it has been responsible to separately designated civilian organizations and authorities. In fact, NATO policy is to provide continuous encouragement and support for the transfer of functions in society to the local authorities.¹¹³

The duties of the CIMIC branch should be defined separately for each operation, and flexibility is required in the formation of the necessary organizations. The staff should nevertheless be capable of participating in headquarters planning work at all levels regardless of the operation in question,¹¹⁴ and should possess above all a good knowledge of the operational patterns followed by international organizations. The need for this has become particularly evident in the context of training sessions arranged for the purpose of studying different actors' special characteristics and modes of operation. NATO member countries are also expected to possess a national capacity for forming CIMIC organizations, and partner countries an ability to form units or parts of these in particular branches of activity. The CIMIC groups formed for a particular operation are regarded in the doctrine as the hard core of all activity.¹¹⁵

The principal duty of a CIMIC group, which can comprise a headquarters group, a headquarters company and a variable number of CIMIC companies, is to support the operation's own organization by implementing practical tasks in its own branch of activity. Such a group will normally possess experts in civilian administration, industry, humanitarian aid, economics, commerce and social affairs, and can also be part of one country's national contingent. The group will be trained to take responsibility for the tasks detailed above, and may be assigned to function over the whole area of the operation or

a region controlled by a particular brigade or division.¹¹⁶

From a national point of view it is important in the initial stages of an operation to establish a working relationship with the operation's CIMIC group, and it is useful to involve the experts in various branches in providing support for the planning of one's own activities.

The purpose of the CIMIC centres, which are usually set up outside the military bases, is to provide places that are easily accessible to the local people and which can supply them with the information they need on the work of the international community. The same centres also serve as meeting places for the various organizations engaged in the operation, enabling a flexible exchange of information between actors. The doctrine maintains that if NATO forces are moved into the area of operation after the international civilian organizations, it should be possible for the CIMIC staff to begin work at civilian sites that have already been set up.¹¹⁷

The concept of a CIMIC centre is interpreted in NATO's CIMIC doctrine as referring to a place outside the military bases where the staff are able to work and to meet their cooperation partners. In the SFOR operation, the activities of which may be regarded as relatively well developed, a CIMIC centre is a part of a company and has an area of responsibility of its own. Likewise, a CIMIC building is a physical site set up by a centre, the same as is referred to in the NATO doctrine as a CIMIC centre.¹¹⁸

3.2 CIMIC activities in the EU

The preparations made within the EU for the development of a crisis management capability have included the creation of the following documents of relevance to CIMIC activities: Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for the headquarters of an EU-led operation, the Civil Military Co-operation Concept, which is comparable to NATO's document AJP-09, and a Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Functional Planning Guide for EU-led Crisis Management Operations. The SOP document for an EU-led operation headquarters defines CIMIC as a function involving both a military and a civilian component that is intended to support the operation, the civilian component being regarded as comprising actors that are both internal and external to the EU.¹¹⁹

At the operational level, CIMIC activities provide a convenient means of exchanging information between the civilian and military components. In order to provide favourable circumstances for this, the SOP proposes that at least the following functions aimed at promoting cooperation should be implemented:

- participation in cooperation meetings between the Command Group and other components
- creation of conditions for cooperation with actors external to the EU at a sufficiently early juncture and in accordance with the needs of the operation
- creation of conditions for cooperation with local administrative bodies and representatives of international organizations working with these.

Since the SOP document maintains that CIMIC should contribute to the achievement of the goals of the operation, CIMIC activities need to be taken into account in these goals, as this will ensure consistent working within a branch of activity that covers the whole operation.¹²⁰

The SOP defines the tasks and areas of responsibility of the CIMIC staff as follows:

- production of CIMIC aspects of the orders for the operation
- distribution of CIMIC resources
- cooperation between the civilian and military components at the operational level
- advising the commander on matters concerned with the civilian component
- monitoring of developments in areas of particular importance to CIMIC activities and distribution of information on these to both military and civilian actors
- support for the commander's information campaigns
- support for lower-level headquarters through dissemination of the necessary information
- creation of suitable conditions for cooperation with actors external to the EU
- establishment of a CIMIC centre at the operational level if necessary.

The purpose of the EU's CIMIC concept is to define on a general level what is meant by CIMIC activities and how these should be

implemented in an EU-led crisis management operation. Detailed objectives and ways of working should be defined separately for each crisis management operation by the European Council.¹²¹

The concept sets out from the notion that cooperation between the military organization and representatives of the civilian component may form one of the principal functions within a crisis management operation, and it also allows for changes in emphasis within CIMIC activity as the operation develops. The list of functional entities presented above is an excellent example of how it was possible to draw on experiences gained from previous operations when drawing up guidelines for the EU's CIMIC activities.¹²²

Another factor taken into account in these guidelines is the crisis management capacity of each organization. It is possible to include support for EU civilian organizations within the tasks of the CIMIC branch, which will in turn enable coordination to be enhanced between the military and civilian organizations.¹²³

One of the purposes of CIMIC activities in an EU-led crisis management operation is to create and maintain suitable conditions for cooperation between the military component and both civilian actors external to the EU and the population and administration of the area concerned in order to achieve the objectives laid down for the operation, given that the emphasis in the CIMIC activities is on the achievement of these goals.¹²⁴

The main mission of the military organization is to carry out military operations in accordance with the Petersberg Obligations, while missions that are obviously bound up with civil society and/or the civilian component can be undertaken if it is impossible for civilian organizations to operate in the area and if the measures to be taken are defined in the mandate.

The clearest difference between the EU's CIMIC concept and the corresponding NATO document lies in the fact that the former makes a clear distinction between civilian actors that are internal and external to the EU, the focus of emphasis for CIMIC activities being on the latter. Another difference is the EU document's acceptance of the notion of development within an operation and the consequent need for changes in emphasis in CIMIC activities.

The document that lays down guidelines for planning CIMIC activities emphasizes the need for a joint planning process for the military and civilian components, which should be implemented at the preparatory stage of the operation and continued throughout. It

should be possible to combine the planning bodies at all levels, both within the area of operation and outside.¹²⁵

As a result of this planning, it should be possible to fit CIMIC in as one part of the operational action and to define the conditions prevailing in the area of operation, the influence of civil society on the functioning of the organization, future points of emphasis and the aims of the CIMIC branch.¹²⁶

3.3 Fundamentals of Finnish CIMIC activity

The fundamentals of CIMIC activity comprise national modes of operation, regulations applying to the CIMIC branch itself, orders and instructions belonging to a particular operation, observations made concerning analogous activity in the past and the staff training system. This section will be concerned with the main principles that have influenced Finnish CIMIC activity to date, which are largely matters of directives regarding this branch in particular operations, and the training sessions that have been arranged. Attention will be paid to the reciprocal influence between these principles and practical considerations at points where this is of importance for explanatory purposes. Actual CIMIC experiences are discussed in Chapter 4.

In a total defence system such as that in which the Finnish Defence Forces are involved, a close relation between the military and the civil society occurs naturally, while troops possessing the kind of background that the Finnish forces have are apt to command a good image among the local people without much difficulty. They are also well aware that CIMIC activity is a means of improving their own security. All this means that the CIMIC idea has been well received by the Finnish peacekeeping forces and has aroused great interest among administrators at home in Finland as well, especially those whose own work is connected with international cooperation.¹²⁷

In the case of troops belonging to the major powers, the only mode of action and means of acquiring protection is a deterrent, the creation of which automatically has the effect of alienating the local people and other actors in the area.¹²⁸

The SFOR operation

The CIMIC sector in the SFOR operation is referred to as the opera-

tive level as CJ9 (Combined Joint), as is customary, and it has its own CIMIC department at the strategic level within the SFOR Headquarters. The corresponding designation at the operative level in a brigade or division headquarters is G5 (Group), and that in a battalion headquarters at the tactical level S5 (Section). In everyday speech G5 and S5 are also used to refer to the chief of the respective department or office. It should be noted, however, that the strategic, operative and tactical levels do not mean the same things in NATO-led peacekeeping operations as they do in the normal NATO command structure, for instance.¹²⁹

The CIMIC organization in the headquarters of the Nordic Polish Brigade (NPB), which served as a command headquarters for the Finnish Battalion (FinBn), comprised three elements: personnel, special advisors and resources. Crucial among these elements were the trained CIMIC personnel, while the special advisors in different fields who were attached to the brigade, lawyers, physicians, logistics experts and others, supported the CIMIC activities in their own particular ways.¹³⁰

The majority of the financial resources available for CIMIC purposes at the brigade level in the SFOR operation consisted of funds assigned by the EU, which were used to provide humanitarian aid in the NPB's area of responsibility. Part of the resources available at the brigade level comprised troops and equipment belonging to lower levels in the command structure, e.g. engineer units.¹³¹

The G5/CIMIC group at NPB Headquarters was under the command of an Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS/G5) and had a target manpower of 20 men representing all the nations of the brigade. The group was divided into five sectors: democratization, projects, regional monitoring, resettlement and repatriation, and CIMIC centres. The main duties of these sectors and the opposite numbers with which they cooperated are set out in Appendix 3.¹³²

The first and most important CIMIC task for the NPB was to minimize the impact of the civil society on the division's military operations. This was done by establishing close relations with the local authorities. The second task was to gain the confidence of the local people by implementing measures to improve human rights and living conditions in the area.¹³³

The end state at which the activity was directed was the achievement of freedom of movement and action for the inhabitants of the area by means of cooperation between actors and the combining of

resources. This freedom was regarded as a basic requirement for the construction of a society without corruption, in which the security of all citizens could be guaranteed and economic growth would be possible.¹³⁴

The NPB guidelines also placed emphasis on cooperation with other branches at the same level of command, in order to be able to bring the possible effects of factors involved in the operating environment to the attention of those persons taking part in the planning processes, a function entirely consistent with the CIMIC objectives set out above and having a clearly visible connection with the contemporary NATO doctrine that emphasized support for one's own troops.¹³⁵

There is a certain American-style emphasis on freedom of action and security for one's own troops perceivable in these tasks and objectives, and also an emphasis on operative measures, as is typical of the early stages of a crisis management operation. One important observation as far as all actors are concerned is the action taken to ensure the safety and human rights of the local inhabitants, which is regarded as crucial to all other aspects of development.

Having previously been a part of the operative branch, the CIMIC function of the FINBN was formed into an independent unit in summer 1998, in response to the receipt of a new operative area of responsibility and the resulting new duties.¹³⁶

The purpose of its activities was to achieve the most effective support possible for the battalion's mission and activities proper by means of cooperation with civilians, the main points of emphasis in this externally oriented activity being repatriation and the promotion of democracy, although considerable attention was also paid to humanitarian projects.¹³⁷

The CIMIC activities of the FinBn were divided into two parts: direct and indirect support for the battalion's operations, as shown in Table 1. Direct support referred to measures expected to have a direct impact on the carrying out of operations, the objective being to improve the protection available to the troops and to increase knowledge about the area of responsibility by means other than intelligence,¹³⁸ while indirect support referred to measures intended to have an indirect effect in improving the conditions under which the battalion was to operate, although without interfering in implementation of its military mission.¹³⁹

Table 1. Division and aims of CIMIC activity in the Finnish Battalion, 1998–1999.

	DIRECT SUPPORT	INDIRECT SUPPORT
Measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – contacts with local people and officials – contacts with civilian organizations working in the area 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – contribution to work of other actors – material support for other actors – financial support for other actors – humanitarian projects
Aims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – improved protection for the battalion's own troops – improved local knowledge – achievement of an adequate early warning capacity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – familiarization of the people with the troops and their country of origin – fostering of favourable attitudes among certain target groups – improvement of living conditions for the local population
Target situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – that the actions of the local administration should support the FinBn effort – that the local population should not pose a threat to FinBn personnel – that confidence should be built up between the local population and FinBn, enabling real-time information to be obtained on possible threats – that FinBn should come to know the special features of its own area of responsibility and be able to take them into account when planning its own activities – that FinBn cooperation with international organizations should be possible in the area of responsibility 	

The instructions issued to the FinBn mention a possible increase in the importance of CIMIC if circumstances should develop in accordance with existing agreements and plans, which constituted a significant difference relative to the corresponding document as received by the brigade, which made no allowance for possible changes in the nature of the mission.¹⁴⁰

In the opinion of Colonel Juhani Kääriäinen, who served as commander of the FinBn, greater efficiency should have been sought by increasing staffing resources, but this was not possible, as the target strength laid down for the organization in the original order had

been achieved. Thus it was necessary to react to the situation as was most appropriate in each case, by combining duties or forming units as required. Kääriäinen also emphasized use of the media as an element for improving the resources available for achieving CIMIC goals.¹⁴¹

Another of the CIMIC principles may be said to have been the monthly branch meetings held in the brigade's area of responsibility, which were attended by the office chiefs. These provided an opportunity for exchanging ideas with other representatives of the battalion, although they did not lead to any new decisions on courses of action or other means of increasing the available resources.¹⁴²

Of all the factors governing CIMIC, national customs and ways of working are decisive. Thus the fact that the FinBn belonged to the American division was immediately reflected in the guidelines laid down for its activities. Correspondingly, the decisive factor in practical action was the Finns' view of the completion of their duties. Although a mission might appear the same in terms of the documentation issued, clear discrepancies could easily arise at the practical level, particularly in matters of jurisdiction and restrictions on movement, for the Finnish military code of conduct allows the commander to issue certain authorizations at his own discretion, an aspect that might be called flexibility, whereas experiences in Bosnia suggested that this was not possible in the army of a major power. Flexibility and sensitivity proved to be very much more important assets in the SFOR operation than preparedness on paper.¹⁴³

The main CIMIC principles when the SFOR operation was just getting under way were the national peacekeeping tradition, the basic training received by the men and the broad-based pool of experience obtained through recruiting men from the reserves. These factors combined with a flexible spirit of joint action within the troops can more than make up for deficiencies in preparedness on paper.

The activities of the FinBin in autumn 1998 were concerned more with return migration and associated problems, largely as a consequence of the initiation of RRTF activities in the battalion's area, and this meant that practically everything that was done at the later stages was linked to the return of minority groups. The documentation governing the branch nevertheless contained statements to the effect that the focus of attention continued to be on support for the battalion's own troops. The work was directed in practice in accordance with guidelines laid down by the commander. At the same time plan-

ning was going on within the battalion for strengthening the CIMIC sector.¹⁴⁴

It is always the orders and instructions that are given that create the basis for action, while the real result emerges through the troops' completion of their daily duties. On the other hand, constant evaluation of the situation and the new instructions that are given as a consequence of this enable steady development to take place. In other words, existing orders and instructions can be used to train new personnel and evaluate a unit's own actions, and this in turn stimulates constant development towards attaining the principal objectives. It is also possible to minimize disturbances arising from staff changes by means of up-to-the-minute guidelines and archiving.

Early in the year 2000 the Nordic Polish Brigade was formed into a Nordic-Polish Battle Group (NPBG), still with a CIMIC company, based on the structures remaining from the FinBn. These changes also meant that Finland became the leading country for CIMIC in the area covered by this battle group.¹⁴⁵

The most significant change to take place in group G5 at the Battle Group Headquarters was the replacement of the previous five sectors of its organization with three broader cells:

- return and repatriation
- planning and executive
- projects.¹⁴⁶

Where the group had been organized previously in terms of functional entities (Appendix 3), it was now composed of two main areas of activity, return and repatriation, and projects, together with a cell responsible for the planning and execution of the measures taken. The functional entities nevertheless remained as themes that guided the activities of the battle group, although these, too, underwent some development, for where they had earlier provided clear, direct support for the troops' operative action, in the new division they served in a broader manner to take account of the needs of the civilian component.¹⁴⁷

The functional entities and their sub-entities are presented in Appendix 4. The change in documentation (cf. Appendix 3) is a clear indication of an advance in CIMIC consciousness and skills, and also a sign of development in the area of responsibility towards the objectives laid down for the operation.

In May 2001 the CIMIC company that formed the Finnish con-

tingent was transferred to become part of the American CIMIC battalion, a change that did not affect its principles of action even though it did mean a change of command.¹⁴⁸

New instructions for CIMIC activity in the MND(N) were obtained in 2002 in connection with the division's a new CIMIC operation order. Its principal activity continued to be support for the rehousing of returning minority groups, and its principal means mediation between the various actors involved, together with maintenance of the CIMIC centres, which have proved extremely useful for both the acquisition and dissemination of information.¹⁴⁹

The KFOR operation

The CIMIC branch for the KFOR operation was located in the operative branch at the brigade level, on the grounds of its extreme importance from the point of view of the whole operation and because it was essential for it to be able to influence troop actions directly. Almost all operations were regarded as being connected with the local population and administration in one way or another, and by being located with the operative branch the CIMIC personnel would be able to participate better in operative planning. The CIMIC branch was divided into two sectors: plans and projects, and operations.¹⁵⁰

The main duties of the plans and projects sector involved intelligence and monitoring in connection with projects, and also the arranging of funding for the projects,¹⁵¹ while the operations sector was responsible for arranging cooperation at the regional level. The liaison officers placed in these sectors had the task of maintaining contacts with the four main civilian organizations, the UNHCR, OSCE, EU and United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).¹⁵²

The Kosovo operation proved from the outset to be more advanced in terms of cooperation than that in Bosnia, where it had taken almost two years to achieve a system whereby representatives of all the main actors could meet on a weekly basis.¹⁵³

In spring 2000 the MNB(C) published new orders for its own troops, the CIMIC aspects of which covered mainly projects and their implementation. Projects were regarded as occupying a significant position in the CIMIC activities of the lower levels of command, and it was noted that full advantage should be taken of those that had already been completed. Especially important in this respect was

exploitation of the media in all possible ways. It was also noted that each project should be such that it could be carried through from beginning to end, and that the commencement of a new project should not prevent a previous one from being brought to the desired conclusion.¹⁵⁴

This document also provided instructions on the steps to be taken by units further down the hierarchy if they were to observe conditions in their area to be such that immediate action needed to be taken. The most important message was that such information was to be communicated to Brigade Headquarters immediately, and the word would be passed on from there to the civilian organization in whose area of responsibility the matter lay. The instructions made it quite clear that the MNB(C) is not responsible for providing humanitarian aid, but commanders at lower levels were allowed to intervene where necessary, within the bounds of their own resources and provided that this did not detract from their actual duties.¹⁵⁵

The instructions contained clear guidelines on military actions in support of civilian society. Efforts were made to underline the distribution of responsibilities between international actors, which is understandable at the initial stage in a crisis management operation. An unflinching refusal to be drawn into matters that are the responsibility of some other organization can rebound against the interests of a military force, however, for it may be obliged to come face to face with the local population on a daily basis, and if the people feel that the troops are indifferent to their plight, this may interfere with accomplishment of the primary mission. The above instructions in fact place commanders at lower levels in a difficult intermediary position, for they are required to have a good knowledge of conditions in their own area and the mood of the people and at the same time to execute commands coming from above.

The headquarters of the Finnish Battalion possesses a G5 office, the strength of which at the beginning of the operation was a chief of staff and two staff officers, although it was increased later by the addition of another staff officer and a clerk, because its resources were inadequate to deal with the amount of work. Each unit of the Finnish Battalion has a part-time CIMIC officer who is subordinate to the chief of staff of the Finnish Battalion's CIMIC office for the branch of the armed services in question (G5).¹⁵⁶

It may be said from experiences with the Finnish Battalion that CIMIC officers should not be assigned to units on a part-time ba-

sis,¹⁵⁷ but that the position should be employed as a means of extending the battalion's cooperation network to cover the whole area of responsibility. Such an arrangement would allow the CIMIC branch to react to events in its area without undue delays.

The new document published in summer 2000 governing CIMIC activity in the Finnish Battalion defined an official and an unofficial dimension for it. The official dimension concerns contacts with the representatives of international organizations and local authorities, and the unofficial dimension refers to the humanitarian aid supported by the battalion and its efforts to complement the work of the aid organizations. The aim of this activity is to gather the necessary information on the situation in the area of responsibility, maintain constant contact with the local authorities and foster as good relations as possible with the local inhabitants.¹⁵⁸ The above division forms part of the definition of CIMIC activity, and it may be understood as synonymous with that described for the FinBn in the SFOR headquarters, where the same two aspects were referred to as direct and indirect support for the battalion's operations.

The ISAF operation

The UN Security Council approved the Bonn Agreement and resolution 1383(2001) allowing for its implementation on 6th December 2001. In an appendix to this agreement the signatories requested the Security Council to authorize the dispatch of what came to be known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan as soon as possible. Approval for this was granted in resolution 1386(2001) of the Security Council, passed on 20th December.¹⁵⁹

The mission of the ISAF, initially under British leadership, was to assist the interim government of Afghanistan in establishing stability and security in and around the capital, Kabul. The organization at the initial stage consisted of a divisional-level Operation Headquarters, the Kabul Multi National Brigade (KMNB) and a number of units directly subordinate to the ISAF headquarters, including the Finnish Detachment in Afghanistan (FDIA).¹⁶⁰

The key functions of the CIMIC branch are defined in the ISAF operation order as being the implementation of rapid impact projects aimed at promoting the reconstitution of civil society, while at the same time the intention was to use this branch to create good working relationships with the surrounding community and with civilian

organizations operating there, as these were regarded as serving the purposes of enhanced force protection. The operation order also assigned the CIMIC branch the tasks of supporting an information campaign and arranging an interpreter service for the operation's own organization.¹⁶¹

The CIMIC organization within the ISAF operation was formed initially by staff belonging to the ISAF Headquarters, the KMNb headquarters and the KMNb Battle Groups. At this point the CIMIC unit of the FDIA formed the largest element in this branch of the ISAF operation. The weakness of these initial arrangements lay in the small numbers of staff located in each headquarters, which prevented planning on a broad scale.¹⁶²

The Finnish Detachment in Afghanistan (FDIA) was responsible for the implementation of CIMIC activities throughout the area covered by the operation, planning of this activity being directed primarily by orders from the ISAF commander and orders and instructions from the FDIA commander. The latter defined the objective of Finnish CIMIC activity as follows: "to acquire the intelligence with respect to the international civilian community in the area, the local authorities and the local population necessary to enable us to perform the tasks assigned to us. It is possible to arrange CIMIC support for the ISAF troops in such a way that this activity promotes the achievement of the overall goals of the operation."¹⁶³

The Finnish detachment was provided with written instructions on how to begin the operation, with separate goals defined for the preparatory stage (the first 14 days) and subsequent activities. The goal for the preparatory stage was that "the CIMIC teams should obtain a realistic picture of the area in which they are to be working, such as will enable them to create the relations essential for proper cooperation. They must also be ready at this stage to implement separately assigned CIMIC projects." The groups were also ordered to lay the foundations for cooperation at least with the ISAF force responsible for their area, the mayors of towns in the area, the chief of police and the heads of the sub-areas within the districts controlled by the mayors.¹⁶⁴

Four main objectives were laid down as a mechanism for directing the activities of the CIMIC teams at the preparatory stage, in that they were to be regarded as having succeeded in this stage if

- they had managed to form a realistic picture of the situation in their area

- they had managed to create a working relationship with the ISAF troops responsible for their area
- they had managed to create the relations with the authorities in their area that were required for completion of their mission
- they had managed to identify the national and international civilian organizations operating in their area.¹⁶⁵

The FDIA advance detachment had noticed certain very considerable barriers to successful CIMIC activities even before the main force had arrived, most notably the weak coordination of CIMIC assignments within ISAF, the small volume of cooperation with civilian actors, the indeterminacy of the areas of responsibility and deficiencies in the available information on the operating environment, and this led the commander of the FDIA and his closest subordinates to draw up a plan for the development of CIMIC activities within the ISAF operation. This plan had the support of the ISAF command, which was partly instrumental in setting the work in motion. The plan consisted of the following points:

- 1) Formation of a body to coordinate CIMIC activity, in order to harmonize internal and external activity and ensure the acquisition and distribution of the necessary intelligence
- 2) Commencement of a programme by the CIMIC teams of the FDIA to survey the operating environment, together with formation and updating of the necessary databases. This work led to the creation of a CIMIC database.
- 3) Initiation of cooperation with representatives of the civilian component
- 4) Determination of the CIMIC plans and resources of the various nationalities represented
- 5) Preparations for the execution of small-scale CIMIC projects in support of improvements in conditions in the area of responsibility.¹⁶⁶

One consequence of the above was that the CIMIC staff of the ISAF operation adopted working methods that laid emphasis on appropriate documentation of all measures taken and the paying of due attention to the operating environment in all outward-oriented activities. In the end one of the distinctive characteristics of these CIMIC activities was the strong desire for cooperation visible both within the ISAF and on the part of civilian actors.¹⁶⁷

One of the most significant sets of instructions to affect the Finnish detachment was the order regarding the construction of a CIMIC database. This was planned in order to facilitate CIMIC work within the FDIA, and later within ISAF as a whole. The database came to cover virtually all matters that had a major impact on CIMIC activities and included data on schools, hospitals, contractors, projects, organizations of various kinds, the local administration, the refugee and displaced persons situation and other relevant factors.¹⁶⁸

The core of the database consisted of a set of area files (AF), which each CIMIC team was responsible for maintaining with respect to its own area of responsibility, so that its updating formed part of their everyday routine. The area files were used for providing introductions to the area, introductions to their own activities, support for the work of partner organizations and training of the ISAF troops.¹⁶⁹

Training of Finnish CIMIC personnel

In the light of experiences with CIMIC activities, a working group was set up in Finland in 1998 to plan leadership training for cooperation in the field of crisis management.¹⁷⁰ The first course in civilian-military cooperation in international crisis management operations to be based on the recommendations of this working group was held in winter 1999, its aims being:

- to provide an introduction to the conditions prevailing in crisis situation from a CIMIC viewpoint
- to train Finnish military and civilian personnel for command, management and advisory duties in crisis situations
- to improve cooperation between the civilian authorities, non-governmental organizations and the military
- to create a national CIMIC policy.¹⁷¹

This course was an obvious outcome of the deliberations of the working group set up by the Ministry of Defence on 15th January 1998, since the working group stated in its report that courses of this kind could play an important role in the maintenance and development of international crisis management facilities in Finland. It had also recommended that the venue for such a course could be alternated between training establishments belonging to the police force, rescue services and defence forces.¹⁷²

It can nevertheless be seen fairly clearly from the statements made by the working group and the aims of the course as detailed above that the idea of CIMIC activity was not necessarily appreciated correctly. CIMIC is a purely military term, implying that when a military organization collaborates with a civilian organization in the framework of a crisis management operation, the persons responsible for this will belong to the CIMIC branch of the troops concerned. When civilian organizations pursue similar collaboration with each other, on the other hand, this is not CIMIC activity. In other words, the term always requires that one party should be a person belonging to a military organization and trained and assigned specifically to this branch of activity, i.e. with the implication that he will act according to orders from the military organization.

The course dealt with general themes related to CIMIC activity, the main barriers to a more detailed treatment being the paucity of research in this field and the lack of experience on the part of the personnel.¹⁷³

A second CIMIC course, this time commissioned by the international section of the General Staff and run by the National Defence College, was held in summer 2000. The outline for the course emphasized this time that it was to deal specifically with civilian-military collaboration, and a clear distinction was made between civilian crisis management and rescue services.¹⁷⁴ It was partly because of the ignoring of this distinction that the character of the previous course had deviated from that intended.

Finland's announcement that it was prepared to place a CIMIC company at the disposal of the EU crisis management troops was regarded as far as the organizers were concerned as being crucial to the need for such a course, as also was the multidimensional nature of crisis management operations. The following themes were laid down as aims for the course:

- to introduce personnel to matters connected with crisis management operations from a CIMIC viewpoint
- to provide an impression of the activities pursued by actors engaged in crisis management
- to gather together data on current operations obtained at various levels
- to gather experiences as a basis for future training and recommendations

- to train the participants to act in a CIMIC command, managerial or advisory capacity in international crises.¹⁷⁵

The teaching aims of this second course were thus consistent with those of the first, and it was naturally these aims that governed the content of the teaching. On the other hand, if one of the aims was to train personnel for CIMIC command, managerial or advisory functions, it must be admitted on the basis of the information provided in Chapters 2 and 3 of this work that the time available was simply not sufficient to allow this to be achieved.

The most efficient and relevant training provided for Finnish CIMIC personnel to date has been that obtained mainly through the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) course in Denmark and the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) courses in Finland. The content of these courses has been such that they have provided participants with an adequate theoretical background for working in a CIMIC capacity in crisis management operations.¹⁷⁶

There are at present about 150 Finnish soldiers (in active service or in the reserves) who have participated in CIMIC courses, and about 300 who have been involved in CIMIC work in various operations, about a half of whom gained their experience in the CIMIC company attached to the SFOR operation.¹⁷⁷

The aim of the CIMIC courses arranged twice a year in Denmark in the context of NORDCAPS is to provide a basic knowledge of the field, covering terminology, the operating environment, the most frequent collaboration partners and basic operative models, all in connection with the most frequently encountered tasks. The lecturers are highly experienced military and civilian experts, and this contributes substantially to the quality of the courses. The participants have been mainly from the Nordic countries, but a few places on each course have been reserved for people from outside the Nordic region. The international nature of the participants also means that the language of communication is English, providing further preparation for active service in this field.¹⁷⁸

The Finns who have taken part in the NORDCAPS course have mostly been due for assignment to an ongoing crisis management operation the following year, and this has meant a high degree of motivation and has thereby promoted achievement of the aims of the course. The feedback received from participants has also been

extremely good.¹⁷⁹

The syllabus for the FINCENT training designed for CIMIC staff has been the same as for the NORDCAPS course. The participants to date have all been Finns, but the lecturers have introduced an international element, and again the language of instruction has been English.

From a national viewpoint, the FINCENT course has excellent chances of developing into a real introduction to the work of CIMIC personnel. Those in charge have attempted to keep it as practical as possible, and this has helped to maintain interest. It has consisted of lectures, group work and practical exercises.¹⁸⁰

3.4 CIMIC collaborators

This section will be based on observations concerning collaboration between the military and civilian components, the purpose being not to describe the backgrounds or juridical status of the various organizations but to point out certain things that have to be taken into account when planning cooperation with certain actors. For this purpose it is necessary to divide the civilian component into two main groups, which can then be further subdivided. The first comprises local civilians, among which one can distinguish the administrative authorities, local inhabitants and representatives of national non-governmental organizations, while the second comprises the international civilian community, which can be divided into representatives of international organizations and representatives of international non-governmental organizations.¹⁸¹ There may also be some civilians who are representatives of international non-governmental organizations that work independently, so that they cannot be said to be part of the international community. The external collaborators encountered in a CIMIC context are presented in Figure 5.¹⁸²

It was seen in the Bosnia and Kosovo operations that conditions for civilian life develop slowly relative to the military demands laid down in peace treaties. It proved possible in both operations to fulfil the objectives with regard to the armed forces of the parties to the crisis practically in accordance with the agreed timetable, but the repatriation of ethnic minorities and the formation of local administrative bodies have proceeded very much more slowly than was planned.¹⁸³




Figure 5. CIMIC collaborators

In the case of the Bosnia crisis it may be said that the improvement of civilian conditions was left entirely to the international community, since the local administration was utterly unable to bear the responsibility for the development of civilian society, largely on account of the changes in political power relations and the lack of economic resources.¹⁸⁴

In the Kosovo operation the KFOR troops found themselves in the initial stage having to take responsibility for tasks that had originally been delegated to other organizations, e.g. policing duties and the administration of towns and rural areas, in addition to the distribution of humanitarian aid. The principal reason for this was that the civilian organizations were unable to move into the area with the same speed as the KFOR troops.¹⁸⁵

It is thus evident that on entering a crisis area, a peacekeeping force must be prepared to undertake all the major functions, humanitarian, administrative and others, in addition to its military mission. The main problem, however, is the almost inevitable imbalance between duties and resources that will arise if the leading organizations are not able to take charge of their areas of responsibility at the initial stage. This means that the peacekeeping troops must be capa-

ble of acting in collaboration with the international civilian organizations at the stage when these are ready to take over the duties assigned to them.¹⁸⁶

A peacekeeping force is an instrument of the international community which is available for use, by the UN, for instance, in accordance with existing agreements, to enable certain defined objectives to be achieved. It is thus involved in a military mission, the success of which requires that account should be taken of the civilian population and other actors in the area in all the operations required.¹⁸⁷

The local population can have a considerable influence on the actions of a military force engaged in a crisis management operation, and this fact needs to be recognised at the planning stage. An understanding attitude towards the civilian population can improve the conditions for operating in the area, and it is thus necessary to learn about local customs and habits at the training stage and take these into account in the field.

It is possible to obtain information from the local population which may not be available from any other source, e.g. on areas in which it is safe to move, earlier events in the region, internal tensions within a population and even the attitude of the population towards the troops themselves.

CIMIC interaction with the local population and civilian organizations working in an area occurs on a daily basis at the battalion or brigade level, and this cooperation should be systematic and be in the hands of personnel who are trained for the purpose and observe generally defined guidelines. Care has to be taken to maintain and develop conditions that will allow this cooperation to take place in accordance with the needs at any given time. In an area where measures have been planned for supporting the repatriation of minority groups, for instance, it must be possible to create conditions that enable negotiations to be held between all the parties involved.

Cooperation with civilian organizations can be examined from the point of view of peacekeeping forces by reference to the following questions:

1. With what organizations are working relations to be established?
2. How are these relations to be established and maintained?
3. What demands does such cooperation place on peacekeeping forces?
4. What limitations exist with regard to this cooperation as far as the peacekeeping forces are concerned?¹⁸⁸

The possibilities open to peacekeeping forces are to a great extent dependent on the existence of good working relations with the local administration, and in this sense a peace-keeping force can do a lot to influence the environment in which it is expected to carry out its mission. Mutual trust can go a long way towards improving the chances of normalising and developing conditions in a crisis area.

One characteristic feature of CIMIC as implemented in the ISAF operation has been close collaboration with representatives of the local administration. The responsibility of the local people for development in their own area was stressed in all aspects of the operation from the outset, and consequently the CIMIC teams were given instructions to include in their planning the question of taking these representatives into account and ensuring their commitment to the measures adopted.¹⁸⁹

One of the tasks of the peacekeeping force has been to support the legally constituted local administration in the measures that it takes in accordance with existing agreements. This provides the force with an opportunity to demonstrate to the local people the importance of honouring such agreements, but it also obliges it to display a capacity to react suitably to any breach of the agreements. Thus CIMIC activities at the battalion level have to be directed as required towards guiding the local administration to comply with its agreements, and the crucial factor in this is undoubtedly good personal working relations with the administrative representatives.¹⁹⁰

It is useful to establish suitable conditions for cooperation with the local administration immediately and to maintain them by means of proper sharing of information and regular meetings. From the viewpoint of the peacekeeping force, this cooperation is grounded in two clearly distinguishable objectives: 1) maintenance and improvement of its own capacity for action, and 2) improvement of conditions in the area.¹⁹¹

As part of the international community, the military force is obliged to intervene when it detects any deficiencies or injustices, and in this way to improve living conditions for the civilian staff in the area. Correctly focused assistance can do much to promote positive development, although it is also true that all actions should be directed towards stimulating local development initiatives that pursue the agreed objectives.

There are many aspects of the work carried out in crisis areas that are the responsibility of civilian organizations, e.g. humanitari-

an aid, questions of human rights, protection of minorities, refugees, assistance in judicial matters, health care, reconstruction, agriculture, education and the financing of projects. Civilian organizations are in general highly independent, to the extent that most of them regard autonomous action and independence of power structures as essential characteristics of their work. Indeed, experiences have shown that neutrality can be a decisive factor in the work of a civilian organization to restore an environment ravaged by a crisis.¹⁹²

There can be several hundred civilian organizations working in a crisis area at the same time, however, and it is essential for the responsible military force to be able to distinguish the various types involved. They may be divided into two main groups:

1. International organizations (IOs), i.e. organizations that are recognised internationally and which have the capacity to operate at an international level, e.g. UN organizations
2. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), i.e. organizations that function on a voluntary basis and typically in an independent manner. It is possible to speak of both national and international NGOs.¹⁹³

Other significant actors in crisis areas in addition to the above organizations are Governmental Organizations (GOs), such as the American USAID mentioned above, as it is largely through these that governmental development aid is channelled.¹⁹⁴

When examining cooperation between a peacekeeping force and civilian organizations operating in the area it is important to bear in mind the role of the latter in the operation. In this respect, too, they can be divided into two groups, Lead Agencies, as named in the contracts for particular operations, and those that function simply according to their own ideology.¹⁹⁵ The lead agencies are normally IOs, but it is possible that an NGO may be assigned responsibility for a particular sector in some cases.¹⁹⁶

NGOs have performed tasks in crisis areas that others have not been able or willing to perform, and they are frequently the first organizations to enter such an area and the last ones to leave. Against this background, a peacekeeping force should not underestimate the effect that such organizations can have on the attaining of the common objective of a mission, especially at the early stages.¹⁹⁷

A considerable number of new organizations are likely to appear in an area once conditions become more stable, and it is neces-

sary for the peacekeeping force to be aware of these, to identify them and to keep informed of what they are doing. If the activities of a certain organization are devoted to improving civilian conditions, the force may consider cooperation with it, but each case must be evaluated separately.¹⁹⁸

Many civilian organizations are of the opinion that the military do not understand the individuals and communities that they are trying to protect, while the military may regard civilian organizations as a disturbing factor that distracts from the fulfilment of their own mission.¹⁹⁹ Both views may be attributed in part to earlier bad experiences and in part to unfounded prejudices.²⁰⁰

Smooth cooperation within the international community can create favourable circumstances for presenting a united front, which eases the tasks of individual actors. Overlapping of functions can be avoided by means of exchanges of information, and by taking advantage of its own organization, the peacekeeping force can help to establish efficient flows of information between organizations.²⁰¹ Also, as the most visible element in the international community, the military component can do much to strengthen the position of that community in its area by its own observance of the agreed policies.

Coordination between international organizations is problematic, and the problems increase at the regional level as the various organizations concentrate narrowly on their own particular areas and functions.²⁰² This is partly due to the number of people engaged in the actual work in the field. Many instances in Bosnia and Kosovo have also demonstrated that the possibilities for cooperation are dependent above all on the skills of the people working in the various organizations and their attitudes towards other organizations.²⁰³

Thus in the last resort, the conditions for cooperation are based on personal relations. This means that the military organization must be prepared to change its CIMIC representative if it has proved impossible to achieve the desired objectives, especially since civilian organizations are not always able to do this on account of the small staff involved at the local level.

3.5 Conclusions

From a CIMIC viewpoint, a crisis management operation is a multi-dimensional international undertaking that has both a military and

a civilian component, the latter comprising both national and international actors. The purpose of such an operation is to eliminate the factors that have caused instability in the area concerned.

It is important that a multidimensional crisis management operation should have clearly defined objectives from which the aims of both the military and the civilian component can be derived. It is also important to be able to derive partial goals to be achieved at different stages in the operation, as these provide a clear frame of reference for the assignment of resources and can be used to indicate to the local population a time by which they should be prepared to assume control of given aspects of the running of their own country.

NATO's CIMIC doctrine has obvious deficiencies with regard to the definition of stages, measures and tasks within the implementation of an operation, and it fails to allow for the possibility of changes in the nature of the action required as the operation proceeds towards its overall objective. The corresponding EU document makes allowance for this dynamic aspect of an operation.

Since the stages in an operation determine the focus of attention in CIMIC activities, it is important when drawing up instructions or setting targets to understand which stage in the operation is concerned and what tasks are uppermost at this stage as far as the progress of the whole operation is concerned. The system now available for documenting CIMIC activities makes it easy to create adequate conditions for taking changes in the area of operation into account.

The sets of recommendations available for CIMIC activities lead us to observe that this should be regarded as a functional entity in which the military organization attempts to integrate itself into the conditions prevailing in the area of operation, the emphasis being on taking due account of local customs and habits. At the same time this whole branch of activity may be seen as a clear attempt by the military organization to enhance the combined effectiveness of the efforts made by all the actors involved in order to support achievement of the objectives of the mission and possibly to reduce its duration.

One common deficiency in the sets of regulations examined here is inexplicit definition of the objectives. It is essential here to take the temporal dimension into account. Certain goals are to be achieved at once, while others may apply to the whole duration of

the operation and may be achieved only after several years of work, e.g. transfer of responsibility for the repatriation of minority groups to the local authorities.

It is possible to use one's CIMIC personnel to train troops to function in future operative environments. In fact this can be understood as one of the aims of the activity. The intention is that troops undergoing such training should be able to take conditions in the area of operation into account in the best possible manner in the planning and implementation of their activities. It is also clear that such training will contribute to the security of the troops.

The first tasks of the CIMIC branch when entering its area of operation are to produce an overall picture of the prevailing situation and to construct the infrastructure required for successful combined action. It is these measures that will provide the backbone for CIMIC activity at later stages in the operation. If the persons responsible for planning this activity do not have exact information on conditions and actors in the area, this may lead to inefficient use of resources and possibly a failure to develop forms of activity that will correspond best to the challenges of the environment.

The aim of CIMIC activities at the second stage in the operation, the maintenance stage, will be dependent on the objectives of the operation as such, i.e. what needs to be done in order to allow the troops to withdraw from the area. Activities should be consistent at all levels, e.g. where the repatriation of minority groups is concerned, the aim at the local level will be to identify places to which these people could be repatriated and that at a higher level the creation of an atmosphere conducive to repatriation. It is only in this way that a realistic picture of the whole situation can be formed. This can be done by encouraging representatives of the various levels in the administration to support repatriation, or some other aspect of social policy, by giving them the necessary instructions and recommendations.

Although the NATO doctrine stresses transfer of functions to the local authorities as soon as they have achieved the necessary capabilities for discharging them, the premature handing over of functions can prove detrimental to the achievement of the overall objectives of the operation.

When initiating CIMIC activity it is necessary to pay attention to the role of the local administration in the development of its area, so that as conditions there improve, the matters to be addressed and

the order of importance in which they are placed can be determined locally. If this is not done, there is a danger that the local administration will not be committed to the development work at all. An active approach in these matters can also serve to demonstrate to the local people that their administration works, which will further support peaceful development.

Cooperation with representatives of the civilian component occupies a prominent position when planning to hand duties over to local authorities and organizations. It is also necessary upon transferring responsibility to the international community to create a supervision organization which will ensure positive development in the future.

Examination of CIMIC doctrines can also lead to the identification of a set of means by which such activity can be implemented:

- troop training
- influence on troop planning by raising the CIMIC aspect in this connection
- creation of suitable conditions for cooperation with various actors
- supervision of troop activities when these are bound up with or performed jointly with the local population
- guidance of the military command in CIMIC matters
- provision of humanitarian aid
- implementation of CIMIC projects.

Evaluation of the situation occupies an important position among the methods employed in CIMIC, where the personnel should be capable of providing their own command with forecasts of how conditions and tasks are likely to alter and what are the principal factors likely to be involved in such changes. Appended to these forecasts should be a set of alternatives for further troop action aimed at responding in the most appropriate ways to possible changes in the situation. The time-scale for this should be from one to two years.

A CIMIC organization should consist of three levels: policy, planning and implementation. Each level should have its own cooperation obligations, and these should be clear to everyone. This will enable efficient internal coordination and an adequate flow of information within the military organization.

The task of the level controlling the activity is to determine the focal points and reach agreement with the principal representatives

of the civilian component on the forms of cooperation to be pursued. It should also be responsible for defining the goals of the various stages in the operation.

The planning level will issue orders regarding duties and aims to the CIMIC elements working at the practical level, presupposing that the aims of the activity have been properly defined for use by the planning level and that it has also received adequate information from the practical level regarding the prevailing situation. It is important that the staff at the planning and implementation levels should form a smoothly functioning entity, a feature that can be ensured by the use of a precisely planned and enforced reporting system.

All CIMIC activity calls for a correctly proportioned field organization that is capable of producing the background information required at the planning level and of executing the tasks assigned to it. The basic elements in this field organization are the liaison officers and the detachments responsible for individual projects. Efforts should be made when forming the field organization to achieve regional divisions that enable clearly-defined ways of working to be adopted. This will also be of assistance to the civilian component in its dealings with the military component.

Ideas of CIMIC activity and patterns of working within it vary greatly between actors. From a national perspective, it is important to be able to recognise factors that may influence practical implementation, e.g. the quality of the staff. When operating in an international environment every attempt must be made to ensure that all levels are working in the same direction. National differences in working methods have to be recognised and account has to be taken of them in one's own activities, as these differences can otherwise lead to confusion both among the local population and within other collaborating bodies.

The Finnish CIMIC activity in the Balkans operations can be described as having been carried out very largely on an ad hoc basis, typically with little or no foundation or long-term planning. The working instructions were always devised to respond to the situation as it was at that moment. And yet, in spite of this, it achieved the targets set for the CIMIC branch exceptionally well. One basis for this would appear to have lain in the relatively broad freedom of action granted to it and in the personal knowledge and skills of its staff, derived in turn from their broad experience as reservists re-

cruited from many spheres of life.

Experiences from previous operations can always be drawn on for the benefit of a new one, and thus experiences in the Balkans occupied an important position in the planning of CIMIC aspects of the ISAF operation. Considerable emphasis was placed on a knowledge of conditions in the area of operation and on the creation of a collaborative infrastructure together with representatives of the civilian component.

The CIMIC database available for use in the ISAF operation made a major contribution to planning, giving the operation its memory, enabling earlier measures to be verified and providing an extremely useful means of supporting the work of civilian organizations, especially those whose own field organization was inadequate for gathering the information necessary for targeting their activities correctly.

4 EXPERIENCES OF CIMIC

4.1 The SFOR operation

The Finnish Battalion (FinBn) took charge of an operative area of its own on 15th September 1999, under the command of a battalion officer, with the leaders of the various branches responsible for their own intelligence arrangements. The whole takeover process lasted about three weeks, the area concerned having been previously located partly within that of the Norwegian battalion and partly that of the United States Armoured Infantry Regiment. The CIMIC branch was responsible for exchanges of information with the corresponding branches of the withdrawing forces.²⁰⁴

The takeover was complicated to some extent by the fact that the Norwegian battalion was at the same time taking over a new area of responsibility, while the US regiment was preparing to withdraw one battalion from the region entirely. The process could therefore be described as a kind of chain-reaction in which the interest of each actor was in its area of future responsibility, so that there was little opportunity for the cooperation with the withdrawing force that would really have been required for the mission, other than through a few official functions. The fundamental reasons for this were a shortage of time and pronounced differences in interests between the withdrawing forces and their successors, and the effect was compounded further in the Finnish case by the lack of any formal CIMIC plan.²⁰⁵

The main CIMIC objective initially was to provide the battalion's command with a clear picture of conditions in the area of responsibility, the groups exercising influence there and the international organizations working there. This information was used for operative planning purposes and for defining the tasks of the various units. This could have been done at the stage of taking over the area, but was prevented by the lack of planning and shortage of time available.²⁰⁶

An OHR-led Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) had commenced operations in autumn 1998 over a territory that included the FinBn area of responsibility. The principal purpose of this force was, and still is, to support repatriation of the former population,

and its functions include coordination of the work of a number of organizations. The RRTF can therefore be regarded as a kind of discussion and information forum dedicated to making more efficient use of existing resources.²⁰⁷

According to the findings of the American Carnegie Commission, suitable conditions for repatriation can be created only through measures taken by the state itself that are acceptable at all levels. It is only in this way that long-term progress can be achieved.²⁰⁸ In the case of Bosnia, however, the local administration was not especially willing to support the repatriation of former minorities, and its participation in the activities of the RRTF was far from satisfactory, although there were, and are, some local exceptions. Eventually, however, the efforts of the RRTF did cause preparations for repatriation to be made in many villages in the FinBn area of responsibility, and as a result support for repatriation did become an important area of CIMIC activity.²⁰⁹

In the light of the above circumstances, it may be said that a clear alteration in the nature of CIMIC activity took place in the FinBn, for at the initial stage it was mainly devoted to supporting the functioning of its own troops, consisting largely of the compiling of data on the area of responsibility and the maintaining of contacts with other actors there, with the aim of pre-empting situations and events that might otherwise have detracted from the battalion's work in the area. Information was obtained, for instance, on visits made by displaced persons to their former places of residence and on religious festivals and other events arranged by different groups within the population.²¹⁰

The repatriation of minorities, and with it the whole development of a certain area, can be upset on account of a single misdemeanour. One example of this was the village of Bocinja Donja in the district of Maglaj in Northern Bosnia, where a group of fundamentalists had arrived towards the end of the war and had occupied houses that had been abandoned by people who had been driven away by the war and ethnic oppression. The occupation of abandoned houses constituted a barrier to repatriation and was therefore in contravention of the peace treaty. The fundamentalists called themselves Mujahedin warriors and claimed that their mission was to help their religious brethren in a holy war against the Serbs. It was also suspected that one of their purposes was to convert the local people to Islam. The group had about 30 members, from Palestine,

Afghanistan, Syria, Jordan and Pakistan, and they were joined at first by about 90 Bosnian Muslims, mainly illiterate men and women who had been living under fairly primitive conditions in the more remote villages, and by the end of 1998 the community had grown to about 300 persons. Through their own hostile behaviour and by cutting themselves off from the rest of society they had succeeded in spreading an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in the area.²¹¹

The International Crisis Group (ICG) addressed the Bocinja Donja situation in its autumn 1999 report, where it admitted that this was a problem and that the SFOR had been inefficient in dealing with it. The force was not even patrolling the area adequately, because it was anxious to avoid falling victim to the group's violence. This was regarded as one barrier to any solution.²¹²

The situation altered radically in April 2000, however, when the new chief administrator of the Maglaj district openly advocated driving the Islamic fundamentalists out of Bocinja Donja in order to return the houses to their rightful owners. At the same time the SFOR troops intensified their activities in the area and set up a patrol base in the village in order to place it under constant surveillance.²¹³

This change was brought about most of all by the fact that the local people had had enough of the situation. The international community had cut off all aid from the district for almost three years because of its previous administration's connivance in activities that contravened the peace treaty and its efforts to prevent repatriation.²¹⁴

The above example illustrates the fact that the eventual responsibility for peaceful development in an area rests with the local people, and that the international community can influence this development by working in the same direction, in this case by cutting off aid. In terms of time, however, the solving of the problem in the above case took too long, for when development comes to a halt in a certain area there is always a danger that new barriers to its recommencement may emerge, e.g. organized crime may become established there.

The plan was that the Bosnian Peace Treaty was to be put into effect through the efforts of both components, the military component being based on the NATO planning and decision-making system and the civilian component on activity directed by the OHR. No clearly defined body had been planned for initially to coordinate activities between these two elements, however, a deficiency that was felt most of all at the operative and tactical levels.²¹⁵

The coordination of activities at the strategic level had been entrusted to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)²¹⁶, and the OHR-led Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF), set up in 1997, enabled coordination on a practical level, although delays in setting up the latter had greatly detracted from the enforcement of the peace treaty. This was reflected most of all in the international community's lack of a clear policy towards those guilty of infringing the agreement. Incidents like that at Bocinja Donja could have been avoided by immediate concerted action.²¹⁷

In accordance with its role as the lead organization, the UNHCR has attempted to coordinate the repatriation measures in Bosnia. Its Consultative Working Group is a national-level coordination body aimed at producing ideas on the subject, while its Repatriation Working Group is of a more practical nature, also functioning at the national level, chiefly in questions concerned with those returning from overseas. At the ministerial level there is the UNHCR-led Joint Civilian Commission Working Group on Refugees and Displaced Persons, which is intended primarily to resolve questions that may prove to be barriers to repatriation. This body also received support from local and regional working groups.²¹⁸ The UNHCR working groups reflect well the efforts made by this body to influence decisions taken at the national level. The problem lies in practical implementation, however, frequently on account of a shortage of staff at the lower levels in the hierarchy.

Even though organizations may not have the proper facilities for cooperation when they are created, it is inevitable that representatives of the military and civilian components will come face to face sooner or later, as for the most part their interests coincide in the same spheres of activity. This means that collaboration is even possible at the tactical level. If it does not exist at the operative and strategic levels, this can very well be reflected in differences of interest at the tactical level. It is possible, for example, for a situation to arise in which the civilian component is placing emphasis on the return of certain minority groups to their home districts at the same time as the military component is providing humanitarian aid for the communities that have to be moved away in order to permit these groups to return.

As far as the Finns were concerned, a sharp change in CIMIC activity in Bosnia took place with the restructuring of the Nordic-Polish Brigade in 2000,²¹⁹ when a CIMIC company was formed to

work in the area covered by the combat detachment. This company was divided among three CIMIC centres, each with its own area of responsibility.²²⁰

According to reports by the staff of this CIMIC company, its principal task was the elimination of factors preventing repatriation, which meant in practice the conducting of negotiations and reconciliations, the acquisition of resources and the carrying out of various projects. Another important aspect was the communication of information to the responsible civilian organizations and close collaboration with these.²²¹

Two significant observations may be made regarding the formation and functioning of the Finnish CIMIC company. Firstly, an operation may differ from one area to another with regard to development, and secondly, a military force can take measures of its own to promote regional action for the achievement of the overall goals by adapting its own organization to respond to the challenges of a changing environment.

Conditions in the area of responsibility of the Nordic-Polish Brigade eventually developed to the point that there was no longer any need for the CIMIC company, which led to it and the whole Finnish contingent being subordinated directly to the division headquarters and attached to the American CIMIC battalion. This move was clearly motivated by the good results achieved in the NPB area, which had been duly noted by the divisional command. The aim now was to increase the CIMIC input in other areas where development to date had been somewhat slower.²²²

Two crucial observations connected with the Finnish CIMIC company's assumption of its new duties have been made to date. The first of these concerns the archiving of information in such a way as to make it easy to recover and use at a later stage. The company began work in its new area of responsibility by surveying conditions there, and as the area partly coincided with the operative area of responsibility of the FinBn, detailed files were already available on its towns and villages, but these could not be made available to the CIMIC company because no one knew where they had been stored. A second significant observation concerns the unsuitability of troops from a major power for practical CIMIC work. This is not a matter of personnel but of organization, i.e. troop protection and security is emphasized to such a decisive degree that it creates a barrier to any contact with the local population, e.g. in terms of di-

rectives regarding the wearing of protective clothing, carrying of arms and the complement of a detachment.²²³

4.2 The KFOR operation

The operative environment for the Finnish Battalion in the KFOR operation in autumn 1999 differed greatly from the situation in Bosnia, as the towns and villages of the area had no official administration of any kind, only some "self-appointed local councils". Also, the battalion's CIMIC staff were obliged at the beginning of the operation to take on tasks that were assigned to the UN and OSCE under the existing agreements, one of which was participation in the administrative bodies formed for the town and villages. Such a commitment to local administrative structures was not a desirable feature, however, as it made it difficult to maintain an objective view of the total situation. In any case, these additional functions tended to overload the CIMIC staff, especially at the early stages of the operation.²²⁴

The aims of the collaboration between the Finnish Battalion and the local administration at first were normalization of the situation, reorganization and activation of the local administration and improvement of general security, the main means employed for attaining them being a constant presence over the whole area of responsibility, the arranging of village meetings and the inviting of representatives of minority groups to meetings in the area.²²⁵

The village leaders and others who represented the local population at the various meetings were well aware of the content of the agreements that had been drawn up, and were therefore in a good position to pursue their own interests, and if the people were dissatisfied with their representatives' actions, they had their own way of finding new ones. This complicated the battalion's attempts at planned cooperation and systematic development of local conditions, as also did the hostile attitudes that prevailed between the population groups. Thus the plans laid down by the international community did not by any means correspond to reality, and the only way of achieving some sort of progress was alternating applications of the whip and the carrot.²²⁶

When the international civilian organizations arrived in the area the Finnish Battalion handed over some of the above duties to

them and directed the resources released in this way more towards coordination of events in the area and the provision of assistance for the population. The CIMIC staff also supported their own organization by producing intelligence and evaluating the general situation in the area and the progress that was being achieved.²²⁷

The CIMIC branch continued its supervision of the local administration, thus providing support for UNMIK, and a special character was introduced into its activities by cooperation with the OSCE in connection with the elections in autumn 2000. Major projects carried out with various organizations also tend to set guidelines for future cooperation, and a military organization can exploit its CIMIC activities to bind the main civilian organizations together into a more homogeneous unit. It should be remembered, however, that the military organization must be a generator of cooperation and not merely a consumer of it, as is also the case with other participating organizations.²²⁸

Looked at in retrospect, it should have been possible, in the opinion of Lt.-Col. Kari Sainio, the first commander of the Finnish Battalion, to commit the CIMIC activity more firmly to the service of the battalion's other operative functions. The most important functions, he claimed, were operative planning and cooperation in the field of intelligence, as this would have improved the conditions under which the troops were operating and would have increased security.²²⁹ This view on the part of the commander serves well to describe the nature of CIMIC at the initial stage of the operation, and it is also a clear indication that methods can easily be transformed into goals in the context of practical operations. If the objective at the initial stage is to create suitable conditions under which the troops can function and to provide them with sufficient information about conditions in the area, the task of the CIMIC branch should be to generate information and its methods for achieving this should be the creation of contacts with the local people and other organizations functioning in the area. It is only after this that it will be possible to commence activities that may promote long-term positive development.

The CIMIC aspect of the KFOR operation took shape very much in accordance with the UNMIK column philosophy, which is composed of four elements: 1) UN responsibility for the temporary civilian government, civilian police force and prison system, 2) UNHCR responsibility for humanitarian aid, 3) OSCE responsibility for the restoration of institutions and the training of judges, and 4) EU re-

sponsibility for reconstruction. The main functional entity in all this is support for the actions of the civilian organizations, while identification of needs for humanitarian aid was also an integral part of the CIMIC activity of the Finnish Battalion in its own area.²³⁰

The SFOR and KFOR operations differed markedly in the conditions for cooperation that existed in their areas. In the first place, the duties and measures to be carried out by the civilian branches were not so clearly planned in advance in Bosnia as they were in Kosovo, the latter situation probably being a consequence of the international community's experiences in Bosnia. Thus Kosovo may be regarded as an evolutionary version of a multidimensional crisis management operation. There were still major deficiencies in the readiness of the various actors for entering the area, however, which had the direct effect of complicating the range of duties facing the KFOR troops. Once the international organizations entered the area, the main ones among them were in practically daily contact with the Finnish Battalion, for instance, perhaps partly on account of the involvement of the military in so many fields of activity in the initial stages.²³¹

The Kosovo CIMIC staff were of the opinion that the main aspects of CIMIC activity are the communication of information, the maintaining of contacts, collaboration and support for the work of international organizations.²³² This is an interesting view, because it implies that fundamentally, the only function of CIMIC is to create resources for the use of others, and the statement bears witness to a deficiency arising from the organization's inability to assign itself clearly defined tasks and modes of action for the fulfilment of such tasks. It should be remembered, however, that the theory provides only the principles for action and it is practical conditions that direct everyday activities. Even in this case the focus of practical attention was on support for the activities of the various organizations, and it was this that partly influenced the statement. One danger here is that the real objectives may be obscured, and in this sense the view of the commander of the Finnish Battalion regarding CIMIC activities at the beginning of the operation differs markedly from the ideas of those who carried the work out.

When representatives of the Finnish contingent in Kosovo visited Bosnia in autumn 2000 to acquaint themselves with the situation there and with the activities of SFOR, the most concrete of all the results to emerge from their visit were observations on the work

of the CIMIC centres. These led the commander of the Finnish Battalion to order his own staff to assess the need for corresponding centres in Kosovo and the chances of setting them up. Preparations for doing so began in spring 2001. The main conclusion to emerge from the visit as far as CIMIC activities were concerned was that if the situation in Kosovo could be resolved in a manner which satisfied both sides, the focus of attention in the KFOR operation as well could be shifted towards a CIMIC orientation. This would greatly alter the mission of the CIMIC branch, of course, for the main aspect of its mission at that time, according to the commander, was to provide support at the operative level.²³³

Experiences in Kosovo nevertheless suggest that the coordination of CIMIC activity between nationalities may prove a problem, largely because the Finnish Battalion has a considerable amount of national finance available for implementing its projects, which are thereby bound by national regulations, so that the planning of activity at the brigade level, for instance, would not be successful in all respects.²³⁴

According to representatives of the civilian component in Kosovo, CIMIC organizations should not be attached to extensive projects, as their staff frequently lack the expertise for directing projects and the success of a project cannot be guaranteed by financial resources and an adequate size of staff alone. In addition to professional skills, extensive projects call for longer periods of service in the area, so that spells of about six months are inadequate. These representatives of the civilian component were of the opinion that the CIMIC staff should concentrate above all on communication between actors.²³⁵

The CIMIC activity taking place in Kosovo can be divided into two forms. For some of the KFOR battalions the accent is on project work, while the other group consists of battalions in which the work is predominantly a matter of communication between actors, supplemented with small-scale projects. One striking observation is that all the battalions where the CIMIC staff have received specific training, e.g. through a NORDCAPS course, have appreciated the significance of CIMIC in providing operational support by assisting in the adaptation of the military organization to the crisis management environment and that project work is looked on as only one part of this.²³⁶

4.3 The ISAF operation

Later exploitation of the experiences gained from the ISAF operation will above all support organization of the CIMIC branch, the commencement of its operations and the creation of suitable conditions for cooperation. The ISAF operation set up in Kabul, capital of Afghanistan, differs considerably from the others examined here, the SFOR and KFOR operations.

In the ISAF case the initial strength of the CIMIC branch at both the division and brigade levels was too small to be effective, so that in practice almost every branch carried out its own CIMIC projects without any kind of coordination either within the organization or between the branches.

The ISAF intention had been to implement rapidly effective CIMIC projects all over Kabul at the initial stage in the operation,²³⁷ but the danger in a policy of this kind is that the results will not be of a lasting nature, so that cost-effectiveness will be minimal. Activities aimed at providing support for civil society can easily turn into almost imaginary projects which are noticed only within the organizations responsible for carrying them out. Similarly, the commitment of the local population and administration to development is likely to remain dubious, so that the only purpose behind the efforts made by external actors is to do something concrete.

Many of the liaison officers were responsible for cooperation between the ISAF troops and the local administration in the early stage of the operation, but this responsibility was transferred to the Finns in a subsequent reorganization.²³⁸

As responsibility for contacts and responsibility for projects lay with several different branches initially, this led to overlapping of functions, breaks in communication and mild confusion within the local administration. Although these actors were located in the same unit at the brigade level, their ways of working were not conducive to efficient collaboration.²³⁹

When the Finnish Detachment in Afghanistan arrived in the area about three weeks after the advance party, CIMIC activities had been commenced in the manner described above. Their later arrival did mean, however, that they were able to evaluate the whole situation and plan their own actions better, as the FDIA staff already had at their disposal clear observations on actions taken so far.²⁴⁰

It may be said on the basis of experiences with the ISAF operation that it is essential that persons engaged in the CIMIC branch or working in close conjunction with it should internalize their own role in the activity and the principal objectives of that activity completely, and they must also know at what level in the organization they should be working. Another requirement for clarity of action is that there should be sufficient staffing resources available at each level. The reorganization of CIMIC activities within the ISAF operation led to a heightened emphasis on the command level, planning level and practical level, although all levels were assigned their particular responsibilities for contacts with civilian actors. The clear division into areas of responsibility helped to develop this CIMIC activity, and also served as an indication to collaboration partners of the professional skills to be found in the ISAF.²⁴¹

The strength of a military organization lies in the manpower that it can mobilize in the field by comparison with an ordinary civilian organization, for instance, and it is essential to make use of this advantage, e.g. to obtain full documentation of the measures taken and observations made. This should also allow maximally flexible use to be made of this information on a later occasion. In the context of the ISAF operation the FDIA developed a database of day-by-day observations on conditions in its area of responsibility, and material from this was made available to representatives of the civilian component in an attempt to support their activities and to assist representatives of the local administration in their efforts at developing their own areas.²⁴²

Two different views of CIMIC activity existed in the early stages of the ISAF operation, the British view and the Finnish view. The British view was that efforts should be concentrated entirely on the rapid execution of projects designed to support development in society, while the Finnish view was that it was important to create suitable operative conditions by acquiring an adequate knowledge of the area of responsibility and by constructing a network of collaboration relations, partly in order to be able to carry out projects. There would seem to have been obvious reasons for these differences in outlook, the British view being determined by their position as leaders of the operation for a terms of six months, whereas the Finnish view was based on the principles of sustainable development, in which it was important that the local population should be committed to the development that was taking place. One of the strengths

of the ISAF operation was that it managed to accommodate both of the above views.²⁴³

4.4 Concrete support from the military organization for representatives of the civilian component

This section will concentrate on concrete measures by which the military organization has supported representatives of the civilian component working in different fields. Practical experiences have shown that results can be obtained in operative environments such as those discussed here only when those engaged in the practical implementation of the various functions meet on the site, although even then it calls for clearly expressed policies laid down at a higher level and accepted by all parties.

This section will be based mostly on experiences gained in the SFOR operation, but mention will be made of KFOR measures in as far as they differed significantly from experiences in Bosnia. The support for the civilian component that was involved in the ISAF operation will be examined from the perspective of project work in section 4.5, because the operation was by nature strongly oriented towards this.

In the opinion of Lt.-Col. Erik Erroll, head of department G-5 in the headquarters of the Nordic-Polish Brigade, with responsibility of civilian-military cooperation, in 1999, troops sent to a crisis area have the chance of providing support for civilian crisis management alongside their own military role, by:

- supplying the international community with information on the crisis area, its conditions and its special characteristics. Such information could concern the viability of the road network, mine-fields, the structure of the local population, its attitudes and the formation of public opinion, for instance.
- complementing the international community's contacts with the local community by maintaining close contacts with the local armed forces
- making rational use of the available resources, e.g. transport capacity, minesweeping capacity and reconstruction capacity, according to the situation in each case, in order to support the organizations engaged in civilian crisis management and functions connected with the reconstruction of society

- supporting other international organizations by carrying out small infrastructure projects designed to improve credibility and trust in combination with other international actors
- representing the most visible part of the international community, since military forces have good opportunities to project an image of the unity of the international community and to function as a communicator of information
- offering international staff, and local auxiliary staff if necessary, the same level of protection in their base as is afforded to their own men in the event of a worsening in the situation, and by planning, preparing for and implementing their evacuation from the crisis area if the need should arise.²⁴⁴

Erroll's experientially-based view emphasizes working towards harmony within the international community, which may be regarded as comprising military, political and humanitarian elements. Such a striving towards synergy is not necessarily apparent amongst all actors, however, as noted in section 3.5 above.

Why have the military been anxious to support the work of the civilian component? This is a question that is inevitably raised when speaking in CIMIC terms. The answer is a complex one, but the present work has helped to identify at least the following reasons: 1) by creating close relations with other actors a military organization can improve its own operating conditions and increase the advance warning time for any disturbance, 2) practically all incidents arising in crisis management operations stem from factors belonging to the sphere of the civilian component, 3) by supporting the work of other actors it is possible to reduce the chances of having to use one's own troops, 4) compulsion should be used only as a last resort, and 5) the military organization has to work by all means available towards achievement of the common overall objective of the mission, and thereby towards a situation in which its own troops can be withdrawn.

The support provided by the military for representatives of the civilian component may be: 1) information on the area of responsibility, 2) an action carried out by its own forces which is design to support a certain actor, 3) material support, such as temporary provision of equipment, or 4) part of its own normal activities, e.g. ensuring security by patrolling a certain area. The object of such sup-

port may be a particular person, a given organization or some individual form of activity. Assistance involving materials or practical actions is characteristically of a one-off nature.²⁴⁵ The types of support provided by military forces and the objects of this support are set out in Figure 5.

The nature of the collaboration that takes place and support that is provided will be different at the local, regional and national levels. The accent at a lower level will tend to be on concrete measures that are usually bound to a particular time and place, whereas collaboration at the national level may be of a broader kind, usually involving joint planning work, actions affecting the whole operation, the creation of systems or the regional allocation of resources.²⁴⁶

Support for the restoration of the social order

The measures for the restoration of the social order taken within the SFOR operation were connected mostly with support for IPTF activity. This was based on a bilateral collaborative system.²⁴⁷




Figure 5. Types of support provided by military forces and the objects of this support.

On account of the nature of the early stage in the operation, the support provided by the military component within the scope of KFOR was extremely significant, for the troops were also initially responsible for police functions in their own areas, especially for the maintenance of law and order, and close cooperation continued in the form of protection, material assistance and the provision of intelligence for various search operations. The military component in Kosovo was engaged in very much closer practical cooperation with the international civilian police organization than in Bosnia, largely on account of the obvious differences between the two areas as far as the physical structure of their police systems and the tasks of the international police force were concerned.²⁴⁸

The military organizations have supported the civilian police organization by providing it with information gleaned as a result of their own activities and through practical measures. Such support has taken at least the following forms:

- information arising from a geographical knowledge of the area of responsibility
- information arising from a knowledge of social conditions in the area of responsibility
- information concerning the population of the area
- key persons in the area
- security factors, e.g.
 - safe areas and roads
 - persons representing a possible threat to security
 - tensions between population groups
- plans for evacuating persons enjoying special status²⁴⁹
- supervision of local police activities alongside the troops' own work
- communication of information on local police activities.²⁵⁰

The concrete support for the international civilian police organizations has consisted of:

- protection for operations
- loan of equipment²⁵¹
- supervision of local police activities at agreed points and in specific areas
- joint patrols
- plans for staff evacuation
- assistance with training.²⁵²

Considerable differences have emerged between nationalities in the amount of material support offered by their armed forces. Limitations on such loans have affected only a very small proportion of the Finnish troops' equipment, for instance, largely command, intelligence and weapons systems, the decision in each case being taken by the troops' commander. The Americans, on the other hand, have very much tighter regulations governing the loan of equipment to outsiders.²⁵³

The above points were mostly outcomes of operative functions, while CIMIC methods were used to support IPTF activities in the SFOR operation by improving the working conditions of the local police through the loan of equipment such as computers and office requisites. This has also had direct effects on IPTF activities.²⁵⁴

It may be said from experience that since collaboration between the SFOR troops and the IPTF was based on the work of liaison officers responsible to the operative branch, it is quite understandable that the support provided should have been bound to operative functions.²⁵⁵

The KFOR troops provided considerable support for the training of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) by assisting in this training and lending equipment. In addition, about 1000 soldiers were engaged in border guard duties for the purposes of preventing armed bands of men from operating across the frontiers and engaging in smuggling.²⁵⁶

Support for the development of democracy and administration

The measures undertaken in support of democracy and administration at the local and regional levels consisted mainly of supporting the work of the OSCE in the arranging of elections, and also supervision of the implementation of the results of the election.²⁵⁷

The support took the following concrete forms:

- communication of information
- location and inspection of the polling stations
- training of staff, including:
 - training connected with the area of responsibility
 - security training
 - communications training
 - anti-mine training
 - training in map-reading

- medical training
- supervision of the elections themselves
- transportation and storage of the voting slips
- maintenance of evacuation plans and related training.²⁵⁸

The implementation of this was planned jointly by the operative and CIMIC branches of the FinBn, with practical liaison with the OSCE in the hands of the CIMIC branch.²⁵⁹

The OSCE is not ready to hand over responsibility for the arranging of future elections to the local authorities, as it is shifting its own focus of interest towards support for democracy, largely through day-to-day political life, and the reorganization of the armed forces through a reduction in their size. At the national and regional levels the OSCE and SFOR are engaged in close collaboration above all in the reorganization of the local armed forces.²⁶⁰

Particular emphasis was placed in the early stage of the operation on monitoring and maintenance of the citizens' freedom of movement, which called for close cooperation with the IPTF. The main measures taken by the FinBn were:

- supervision of the police patrols maintained by various entities in the Zone of Separation (ZoS)
- escorting of minority groups through areas controlled by other entities
- ensuring the safety of minority groups attending various meetings and functions.²⁶¹

It was mainly the operative branch that was responsible for these measures, although visits and occasions attended by minority groups were the responsibility of the CIMIC branch in close cooperation with other branches within the battalion.²⁶²

It was the soldiers of the KFOR operation who initiated the development of democracy and administration in Kosovo. By taking charge of the administration of the towns and villages they were able to prevent the remaining elements of democracy from collapsing entirely, and when the UN took responsibility for these duties, the KFOR troops acted to ensure citizens' freedom of movement and basic rights, by providing military escorts where necessary, supervising key points and facilities and assisting in the renovation of physical constructions on a project basis.²⁶³

By supporting the local administration once this was function-

ing in the manner laid down in the peace treaty, the military organization was able to convey to the local population the beneficial effects that its presence could have on the whole area.²⁶⁴ One good example of this was the case of the village of Bocinja Donja mentioned in section 4.1 above, where the international community was able to direct aid to the area immediately the administration of the Maglaj district conformed to the provisions of the peace treaty.

Promotion of economic recovery

Economic recovery is a field in which influence has to be applied at all levels in the structure of the country in question. The possibilities that a military organization has for affecting this process are extremely limited, and a lasting outcome can be achieved only through long-term efforts that usually include the provision of loans to the national government.²⁶⁵

The military force engaged in the SFOR operation was able to support and activate the local economy in the following ways:

- by creating jobs
- by arranging training aimed at employment
- by using the services of local companies
- by carrying out projects in conjunction with local companies
- by arranging small-scale loans.²⁶⁶

SFOR arranged seminars for the training of persons representing local companies in the techniques of applying for loans, western industrial standards, foreign trade and bookkeeping. This was done mostly in conjunction with the Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation Task Force (CJCMTF), a unit to which a number of professionals in these fields had been drafted. The purpose of the involvement of the task force was to evaluate the possibilities in these fields and draw up plans for action. It was also possible for the lower level of command to make use of CJMTF expertise for the planning of its own projects.²⁶⁷

The military organization of the SFOR operation supported economic recovery at the local and regional levels mainly through the CIMIC branch, which determined the resources available in the area and set a large number of projects in motion that made use of local contractors.²⁶⁸

Support for the revival of social and health services

The measures open to the military component with regard to the restoration of social welfare and health services are of two kinds. The priority in the initial stage is to ensure that emergency and first aid services reach their target, and in some cases the assuming of responsibility for such services. Later the accent will be on the acquisition of resources and their distribution to the correct areas.²⁶⁹

It had been decided at the beginning of the operation that local people would not be attended to at the SFOR bases. Only those in immediate danger would be given direct medical help by the military organization. The same policy was then adopted by the Finnish Battalion in Kosovo. On the other hand, both the KFOR and SFOR medical personnel supported the local systems by arranging surgeries in areas where local resources were inadequate.²⁷⁰

The CJMTF has begun measures for reviving the state health service in Bosnia. It has gathered data on facilities all over the country and is attempting to arrange finance for creating a nation-wide health system. One aim in this is to break down the existing barriers to the provision of first aid and other forms of treatment across ethnic boundaries, as health services at present are based on institutions maintained by the various entities within the population, so that it is not always possible for a person to attend the nearest facility that is available. This has led in some cases to the deaths of accident patients because of the long transport distances.²⁷¹

The CJMTF is also working to set up smaller first aid stations, by locating sites where these are necessary, reporting on the prevailing situation and attempting to direct the activities of non-governmental organizations to the most problematic areas. The CJMTF looks on this as the quickest way of addressing problems at the local level.²⁷²

The operations have supported the revival of social and health services at the local and regional levels by:

- directing aid from non-governmental organizations to the correct areas
- repairing local ambulances
- commissioning the building of hospitals and health centres
- delivering medical supplies to hospitals in the area.²⁷³

The above measures have been carried out by the CIMIC branch. One essential in all cases, however, has been location of the appropriate sites, and in this the whole organization has participated. Sim-

ilarly cooperation with local administrators and various organizations has been of importance for optimal allocation of the limited resources available.

Support for the improvement of the general infrastructure

Reconstitution of the infrastructure of a country is principally a national-level undertaking, but it can be supplemented with actions at the local and regional levels. The projects involved in this field tend to be of considerable size, and it is usually only states or the larger international organizations with state backing that can take them on.²⁷⁴

CIMIC methods have been used to support civilians engaged in such projects:

- by determining the conditions prevailing in an area
- by determining the resources available in an area
- by making the organization's services available to support practical measures.²⁷⁵

The SFOR organization was involved in CJMIF projects to repair an oil refinery, the waste water system in Sarajevo and part of the area's railway network, and also in the reconstruction of airports. These projects always included planning, applications for finance, choice of contractors and supervision of the actual work.²⁷⁶

The practical support provided by the troops at the local and regional levels included:

- ensuring security
- making proposals
- arranging finance
- supervising sites
- mapping local resources
- distributing information.²⁷⁷

Refugees and displaced persons

Military support for refugees and displaced persons is usually provided through the respective organization, in all cases the UNHCR, mostly in connection with repatriation or placement in a temporary camp.²⁷⁸ It is also possible, however, for the troops to take direct action, usually in the form of providing humanitarian aid, either from their own sources or mediating that available from other sources.²⁷⁹

The practical support provided by the SFOR troops took the form of:

- distribution of information on the current situation
- surveying of potential resettlement areas
- protection for transport and detachments
- transport of equipment
- material assistance
- monitoring of repatriation
- protection during reconstruction
- coordination and support for the work of assistance agencies
- mediation in disputes between the parties to the conflict.²⁸⁰

Finnish support for refugees and displaced persons in the context of the SFOR operation was implemented mainly by the CIMIC branch, with the pioneer troops, especially the mechanics, also occupying a key position.²⁸¹

The alteration in the character of CIMIC activity as the SFOR operation advanced is perhaps best illustrated by the measures taken with regard to refugees and displaced persons. The main approach adopted at the beginning of the operation was the acquisition of sufficiently extensive information to enable a realistic picture to be formed of the existing situation, in order to provide a basis for the correct targeting of future measures. Also characteristic of the initial stage was the implementation of small CIMIC projects, typically road construction and maintenance projects, aimed at improving living conditions for the local population and the troops' own operating conditions. These created the conditions necessary for the return of refugees and displaced persons and improved the troops' own skills at patrolling the area. Emphasis was also placed at this stage on building up relations with the local people and administration.²⁸²

As the situation developed, CIMIC activity began increasingly to consist of practical measures aimed at repatriation as such, including the planning, implementation and security aspects of visits by minority groups to their former home districts. Later still, the work extended to include support for reconstruction, entailing material and transport support, the arranging of small-scale loans and mediation in disputes between factions. Emphasis at all stages was placed on coordination of the functions of the aid organizations and the communicating of information on new potential areas of activity to representatives of the responsible organizations.²⁸³

4.5 CIMIC projects and humanitarian aid

The CIMIC projects that have been carried out may be regarded as the concrete results of successful collaborative activity, and ones means by which the military organization has been able to support achievement of the overall objectives of the operation. But these projects have also had an indirect impact on the troops themselves, as they are a source of good publicity and help to promote security. It is therefore important that all CIMIC activity should be accompanied by the active dissemination of information. A military organization has only limited possibilities for carrying out projects of the CIMIC kind, and the implementation of these must be carefully planned. A key aspect in this is description of the nature of a proposed project, together with an analysis of who will benefit from it, whether it will arouse conflicts between the factions in the dispute and whether it will endanger the neutrality of the troops with respect to these factions. The criteria for the choice of CIMIC projects by the Finnish contingent in the SFOR operation were:

1. The project should be of the greatest possible benefit for the protection of the contingent's own troops and should not be at variance with the FinBn's military operation.
2. The project should have an optimum input-output ratio, and should provide help for the largest possible number of people in a matter which is of the greatest possible importance.
3. The project must be politically correct. It should help to dispel tensions between the parties to the crisis and improve freedom of movement for civilians.
4. It should support the battalion's intelligence wing.
5. It should be easily delimitable in terms of time, labour input, finance and responsibilities.
6. It should be maximally visible among the local population and receive sufficient publicity in the media.²⁸⁴

The projects carried out following the reorganization of the Finnish contingent were mostly the work of the CIMIC company. The majority of the funds available were directed towards actions that would support repatriation, and some also to projects aimed at improving living conditions for the majority population, mostly involving the renovation of schools and improvements to the road network.²⁸⁵

When the Finnish contingent was placed under the command

of the American division the main criterion for projects became the support that they provided for repatriation. All new projects were to promote the return of minority groups to their home areas in the eastern parts of the Republic of Serbia.²⁸⁶

It is possible to arrange finance for such projects from a number of sources, the main ones in the case of projects carried out by the Finns being the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the contingent's own budget.²⁸⁷

The USAID-financed projects were among the largest to be carried out in the Finnish area of responsibility, usually with the CIMIC branch participating in the preliminary surveys and preparations. The CIMIC branch was also responsible for supervision at the sites and for reporting to USAID on the progress of the work at 10-day intervals.²⁸⁸

EU-funded projects proved more difficult to implement in Bosnia than those based on other sources of finance, on account of the bureaucratic nature of the EU funding mechanism. One consequence of this was that payments to local contractors were often delayed for many months, which gave SFOR the stigma of an unreliable partner in the eyes of local companies.²⁸⁹

Under an agreement made by the Finnish Foreign Ministry with the EU Commission in spring 2002 regarding the financing of CIMIC projects, these projects can be approved by the Commission's office in the area of responsibility, which should allow for close cooperation between the body financing the project and the contractors engaged to carry it out, and extremely favourable results have been reported by CIMIC personnel attached to the ISAF operation, where the system has been described as fast, practical and flexible.²⁹⁰

Experiences with financing arrangements suggest that, in order to avoid friction in their execution, projects should not be of a duration that covers several rotations of staff. They should also be designed in such a way that they can be restricted to a certain length of time or a certain number of phases. This may be of importance if the organization responsible for a project has to be changed, for instance, possibly on account of geographical or functional changes in the areas of responsibility of certain nationalities.²⁹¹

The instructions for the implementation of projects by the Finnish Battalion in Kosovo were the similar to those for the Finnish Battalion (FinBn) in Bosnia, the main differences being connected with

the use of local labour, which was not provided for in the FinBn instructions, although it took place in practice.²⁹² The projects carried out in Kosovo in 2000 were in any case somewhat different in character and scope from those undertaken in Bosnia, being aimed at improving living conditions for the local people, e.g. by supplying them with firewood, water filters and heating stoves.²⁹³

Project work occupied a highly significant position in the ISAF operation, with some 90 projects completed in the first eight months, involving a total investment of around USD 3.8 million. The targets were schools, hospitals, children's homes, police stations, fire stations, administration and basic infrastructure. One common denominator in all of them was a broad-based effect in improving basic security for the local population. The principal sources of finance were the British Department for International Development (DfID), the EU Commission, the British Embassy in Afghanistan and the German and Finnish governments.²⁹⁴

One typical feature of the initial stage in the operation was that all branches expressed an interest in carrying through CIMIC projects "quickly and visibly". Little coordination was possible, and thus the resources devoted to this work could not be exploited to the utmost. Problems also arose because projects had been agreed upon by persons who did not have a clear picture of the prevailing situation, so that some of those belonging to the initial phase would never have fulfilled the project criteria if the CIMIC groups working in the field had looked into their background. Eventually the creation of a CIMIC Coordination Centre (CCC), with an ISAF internal component and a civilian component, enabled the coordination of such projects to be placed on a firm footing.²⁹⁵

The most concrete form of support provided by the ISAF operation for the civilian component at the initial stage was connected with UNICEF's "Back to School" campaign, the aim of which was to encourage the commencement of teaching at every place of elementary schooling at the beginning of the new school year on 21st March 2002. The direct support provided by UNICEF consisted of the necessary teaching materials. One problem, however, was that no one knew how many schools there were in Kabul, where they were or how many pupils they had. The last data available concerned the situation in 1996, and even the information on the location of schools held good in only about 30% of cases any longer.²⁹⁶

As UNICEF did not have the field organization necessary for

such a project, it had no chances of coping with the school question on its own. It was thus the Finnish CIMIC teams that located all the schools in Kabul, almost 200 of them, and produced a basic description of each, including contact information, numbers of pupils and an estimate of the condition of the school building and the costs of repairing it. This was achieved by virtue of the detachment's good relations with the local administration, representatives of which accompanied the CIMIC teams on their investigation missions. The distribution of teaching materials was then accomplished jointly by the Finnish CIMIC teams and the British logistics regiment. The local authorities were nevertheless committed to the project, in that the chiefs of police in the various areas were responsible for security at the distribution centres, and the school authorities were responsible for taking delivery of the material and passing it on to the schools under the supervision of the CIMIC teams. This successful project was a good demonstration to both UNICEF and the local authorities of the potential that the ISAF operation had for supporting development initiatives.²⁹⁷

The multinational engineering unit made a major contribution to the ISAF projects, as it had access to tools that were otherwise unavailable in Kabul and its leaders were extremely favourably disposed to this project work. The close collaboration that developed between those responsible for CIMIC planning and the representatives of the engineers' units was vital in enabling the vacant resources at the disposal of the latter to be mobilized for use in the CIMIC projects.²⁹⁸

The focal points in this project work were determined almost entirely internally within the ISAF operation, with little attempt at seeking compatibility or any impact in common with the plans made by representatives of the civilian component. This was due to the fact that at the beginning of the operation the systems maintained by the lead organizations did not allow for day-to-day working in the field. Thus the CIMIC branch was restricted to trying to increase the overall impact of its projects through collaboration with a few isolated organizations.²⁹⁹

Experiences point to certain changes in the targets of CIMIC projects as the operations have proceeded. In the Kosovo operation project support was directed mainly at individual people and families, as is typical at the beginning of an operation, when severe upheavals are still visible in society, so that it is impossible to maintain

normal living conditions. As circumstances improve, however, partly as a result of the appearance of international relief organizations in the area, the nature of CIMIC projects also alters, typically focusing on the construction of public buildings, e.g. schools, the road network and other aspects of the general infrastructure. Experiences in Bosnia also suggest that military projects have to be directed at some stage exclusively at the principal focus of the whole operation, in this case the repatriation of displaced persons.

It is essential at the outset to be aware of the directions in which project work is likely to develop, as this will enable the correct and maximally efficient use to be made of the available resources. In Bosnia, for example, funds were channelled at the initial stage into the renovation of some schools that did not support the force's activities at later stages. Errors of this kind can be avoided by close cooperation with other actors, as they may have the opportunity to evaluate which areas are likely to experience positive development in the near future so that it would be profitable to invest resources in them.³⁰⁰

Similarly, humanitarian aid distributed at the initial stage in an operation may have the effect of supporting the troops' future mission, as it is a good means of winning the confidence of the people and encouraging them to look favourably on the troops' activities. It is important to avoid measures that may take on a more permanent character, however, and to plan assistance that will be more of a one-off kind, so that the troops will not be committed in the long term to activities for which their resources were not designed.³⁰¹

The humanitarian aid that can be delivered by a military organization consists mainly of equipment of its own, e.g. blankets and foodstuffs, together with materials received as donations, possible from non-governmental organizations in their own country. Organizations can be activated to participate in this by means of suitable information and good personal contacts.³⁰²

4.6 Conclusions

Experiences of recent operations clearly point to a change in the nature of CIMIC activities as they proceed, the focus of attention at the initial stage being on support for the operation's own troops, while once the situation has been stabilized it becomes possible to devote resources to supporting the civilian component.

As they work to increase cooperation between military and civilian organizations, the CIMIC personnel must be careful to avoid drifting too far apart from their own organization and from their real mission, which can be ensured by setting clearly defined aims and issuing precise instructions. Close collaboration between the CIMIC and operative branches at all stages in an operation is also of extreme importance for efficiency of action.

The planning and execution of activities in the area of the operation can be affected by a lack of coordination mechanisms, a problem that was particularly prevalent in the SFOR operation. The representatives of the civilian component have not been in the same state of readiness to move into the area of operation as the military organization has, and this has affected practical activities at the beginning of the KFOR and ISAF operations, for instance. Individuals working at the grass-roots level have nevertheless been able to instigate unofficial forms of activity that have enabled more efficient targeting of regional development and resources.

When planning future actions the CIMIC staff need to take account of the coordination bodies already functioning at various levels, and if there are none, the military organization must be capable of creating a suitable platform for their formation. For this purpose it may be necessary to reserve premises on which representatives of the international community working in an area can meet together. Such activity must, of course, have the approval of the main organizations concerned, which is the foundation for all joint efforts at increasing impact.

It is clear that the measures taken at the beginning of an operation should support those to be taken later, which is quite possible if the overall objectives are used to define partial objectives for the various stages. These latter can then be used to name areas of focus on which the military organization should concentrate the majority of the CIMIC resources available to it.

While working together closely with representatives of the civilian component, the CIMIC staff should make the background to the activities of the military organization clear in the early stages, and should avoid giving the impression that its intention is to direct or lead the work of the organization or person responsible. The rationale for all action should lie in efficient use of the available resources and achievement of the overall objectives, while a further important aspect is supplementation of the actions taken by the ci-

vilian component.

The support given by the military organization to the representatives of the civilian component is the outcome of cooperation and can be either continuous or of a one-off nature, although one should always be wary of commitments to continuous support. CIM-IC activity should be concentrated on the focal points defined for the operation, but it must be remembered that these may vary from one stage in the operation to the next. This is something that has to be taken into account when developing organizations, as the size of the staff and its areas of expertise will have to conform separately to the objectives at each stage.

The concrete support that a military organization can provide for representatives of the civilian component is outlined in Appendix 5, where it is divided into support arising as part of normal activities and that channelled through CIMIC activities. The table also enables the focus of activity to be defined. When doing this it is important to note that the main part of the support for democracy and administration should be dependent on the holding of elections, which will mean a concentration in the timing of the allocation of resources on support for the activity of the OSCE. This implies in turn that momentary changes in the focus of attention can occur even in the course of individual stages in an operation.

The information contained in Appendix 5 suggests that duties connected with refugees and displaced persons have occupied a crucial position in CIMIC activities. This can be argued on two scores: 1) resettlement has been a major factor in the operations considered here, and 2) it is possible to respond to resettlement problems through actions conducted by CIMIC units. It emerged very clearly from the interviews, especially those with persons who had served in Bosnia, that the solution of problems connected with the status and rights of minorities can go a long way towards achieving development in other spheres. Also, the resettlement problems frequently called for rapid reactions and also required the maintenance of constant contacts with the inhabitants of the problem areas. The implementation of appropriate measures called for good public relations skills and in many cases a firm presence on the scene. Combining viewpoints one and two, we reach the conclusion that the existing instruments, in this case the CIMIC units, were applied to the problem to which they were best suited. The planning of CIMIC activity calls for due attention to be paid to one's own capacities for action and recogni-

tion of those areas in which the expertise of one's own troops is insufficient.

The military organization naturally supports the civilian component merely by virtue of its own presence. Viewed in a straightforward manner, the guarantee of a safe operating environment should be sufficient support in itself. Extending this view, however, and taking the political aims and limited resources of the various groups into account, it may be said that joint action is an essential prerequisite for achieving the desired objectives. On the other hand, the activities of the civilian component provide support for the military component, for it would be impossible to resolve a crisis through military means alone in such a way that peaceful development would ensue.

It is essential to take the civilian component into account when planning CIMIC projects that support social development. Such projects should have the approval of the local administration and should support its activities. Thus information on them should be made available in advance to the civilian organizations operating in the area, as this will help avoid the overlapping use of resources and create suitable circumstances for the implementation of joint military-civilian projects.

The implementation of projects is governed by the available financing mechanisms and the criteria that these lay down. Financing mechanisms can also be divided into those through which finance is available rapidly and those in which it is available more slowly. The above observations on financing mechanisms can also serve as tools in the planning of projects.

5 CIMIC PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Planning

Once the planning stage is complete the CIMIC staff should be fully aware not only of the mission ahead of them but also of the distinctive features of the area of operation, external factors likely to affect their work and factors connected with the operation itself, i.e. its background and history, its current state and the objectives set for it. Two alternatives may be envisaged as the starting point for the planning stage: 1) the military force is deploying itself in any area where no part of its organization has been in action previously, or 2) the force is entering an area where other troops from its own organization have been in action previously. The tasks facing the CIMIC branch are nevertheless the same in both cases, but in the second alternative existing documentation may be available, although it will still need to be verified by the force itself during the preparation stage.

The preparation stage is the same for all threat situations defined under the Petersberg Obligations, with individual differences emerging only at the stage of practical implementation. The main factors in this are the operating environment and differences in it between the threat situations.

The following groups of factors need to be taken into account at the planning stage: 1) the operating environment, 2) the tasks assigned to the CIMIC branch, 3) the resources available, and 4) co-ordination of functions.

The operating environment for the CIMIC branch consists of geographical factors associated with the area of responsibility, the local population and administrative representatives and the representatives of the various civilian organizations working in the community. Consideration also has to be given to actors in the unit's own organization, and similarly to the history of the area, the prevailing political situation and the background to the crisis itself.

The state of the operating environment may also be assessed in accordance with the various aspects, or functional entities of crisis management as defined in Chapter 2 of this work:

- restoration of the social order
- development of democracy and administration

- promotion of economic recovery
- revival of social and health services
- improvement of the general infrastructure
- stimulation of culture and education
- establishment of external relations
- civil defence
- boundary patrolling and customs
- civil protection
- refugees and displaced persons

The principal geographical factors from a CIMIC point of view are concentrations of population, seasonal characteristics and conditions for transport and travel in the area, especially factors tending to restrict movement. These geographical factors may be defined in advance from both internal sources, such as the engineering, operative and intelligence branches of the force's own organization, and external ones, the commonest of which are reports and memoranda from civilian organizations that have already begun operations in the area, although valuable further information may be obtained from earlier reports and research findings.

Representatives of the local population and its administration constitute major factors affecting the work of the CIMIC branch. As far as the population is concerned, it is useful to find out its ethnic distribution over the whole area of responsibility, living conditions and attitudes towards the peacekeeping force. In the case of the local administration, it may be of significance to determine the structure of the whole administrative system, from the smallest unofficial community through the entire machinery of the state up to the national level. Attention must also be paid, of course, to the current functionality of these various levels. Regarding individual representatives of the administration, it is important to ascertain who are the principal actors and what resources they have for discharging their duties. Allowance should also be made for influential persons or groups operating in the "grey area" of society and their possible impact on the force's activities.

CIMIC activities are a means by which the military organization is able to adapt itself into a functional element of the whole crisis management operation, for the nature of the mission is such that the working environment of the CIMIC personnel will be virtually congruent with that of the principal representatives of the civil-

ian component. Working with representatives of civilian organizations can in some cases prove extremely difficult. It can be said on the basis of experiences gathered from several operations that the most powerful factor detracting from such cooperation concerns the *attitudes* adopted by both the military and civilian personnel. From a CIMIC perspective, success in one's own tasks calls for the active dissemination of information among those working in other branches of one's own organization and among the main civilian actors, and in some cases the provision of training for these instances. The question of civilian organizations within the operating environment, the types of organization concerned and the ways in which they must be taken into account in the planning of one's own activities have been discussed above in section 3.4.

It is essential at the planning stage to define the objectives of the CIMIC activity and the end state to be aimed at. It is then possible to derive from these a set of goals to be attained in the various stages of the operation.³⁰³ The principal aims for the CIMIC branch are the provision of direct and indirect support for its own troops, support for the local administration, improvements in living conditions for the local population, reconstitution of the local society and support for a separately defined set of civilian organizations, although each stage in the operation as it advances towards its declared objectives will have its characteristic focus of emphasis. The accent in the initial stage will be on support for the peacekeeping force itself, but as the situation begins to normalize the main mission will lie in the reconstitution of civilian society, although it will always be necessary to consider the connection between CIMIC activity and the activities of the troops themselves.

Experiences in the ISAF and KFOR operations suggest that the tasks of the CIMIC branch at the beginning of an operation consist of support for the force itself and to a pronounced extent for the functioning of the local administrative system, and that these functions must be properly coordinated. Such observations need to be taken into account at the planning stage, above all when defining the task of the CIMIC branch.

It is the commander of the military force who will define the ultimate objective of CIMIC activity, which will be phrased in such a way as to indicate the desired end state.³⁰⁴ Definitions arrived at for lower levels must be compatible with these goals for the operation as a whole.

The commander of the military force, in conjunction with representatives of the operative branch, will define the CIMIC tasks, which must likewise be consistent with the aims laid down for the international community. This means that the chief of the CIMIC branch will inevitably have to take part in the planning. The tasks will also have to be defined so as to correspond to the human resources available and the overall objectives of the operation.³⁰⁵

The resources available for CIMIC activity consist of staff, equipment and financing mechanisms. Some of the resources, such as machinery and excavators, are of a "Dual Use" kind, in that their use depends on the prevailing situation. This means that no long-term planning can be entered into that entails the use of equipment belonging to the military organization for supporting the projects of civilian actors.

The human resources may be regarded as comprising the CIMIC personnel working at various levels in the military organization, i.e. 1) at the command level in the operation, 2) at the planning level, and 3) at the implementation level.

Efficiency in CIMIC activity can be achieved by creating CIMIC teams and detachments that are as strong as possible and capable of carrying out CIMIC work on a daily basis, i.e. maintaining contacts with the civilian component, coordinating activities and in some cases implementing joint projects. All CIMIC activity nevertheless calls for support from the command and planning levels.

Attention must be paid at the planning stage to the capabilities of the personnel for discharging the duties planned for them. If the personnel do not have the necessary knowledge and skills for doing this, particular attention will have to be paid to basic CIMIC training in the preparations for the operation.

Professionals in related fields who are attached to the military organization, e.g. engineers and medical personnel, may be regarded as human resources that can be drawn on to a limited extent. They, too, come into the "Dual Use" category.

The human resources available for CIMIC purposes may also be taken to include the local workers who are cooperating closely with the CIMIC personnel proper, the main group of which comprises those employed as interpreters. Other temporary staff may be taken on in some cases, mostly professionals in various fields as required for project work, e.g. constructional engineers with a knowledge of local standards and working practices.

The smooth initiation of CIMIC activities calls for proper definition of the coordination requirements, which will at the same time be a prerequisite for the planning of joint actions between the CIMIC branch and other actors. These coordination requirements can be divided into two types, internally and externally oriented, of which the former may apply to coordination between 1) elements working at different levels within the same branch of the military organization, and 2) elements working at the same level in different branches.

Attention should also be paid during the planning stage, and similarly during the implementation of the activities, to other planning going on in the military organization at the same time. The aim of this internal coordination should be to speed up the military actions as a whole and save on resources. In other words, the CIMIC branch should not waste its limited human resources on work which overlaps with that of another branch or another actor, e.g. with that of the UNCHR, which is responsible for the refugee situation in a crisis area and for recording changes in this.

For CIMIC training purposes it is possible to take advantage of nationally and internationally arranged courses and exercises. If the CIMIC personnel have not had prior training, specialized topics relevant to their tasks should be included in the training provided for the force in general. This presupposes, of course, that the chief of the CIMIC branch has received training for his coming duties and has the knowledge and skills necessary for arranging training for his staff. If the chief can himself be responsible for the training of his group, there is every chance that a team spirit will develop even during the training stage, which will create good conditions for the smooth initiation of activities in the field.³⁰⁶

The training should make full use of the knowledge available in different branches, and those responsible should also be prepared to engage professionals from the local administration where appropriate, although this naturally requires a prior survey to be made of probable future areas of activity. In addition, care should be taken to choose training staff with practical experience and the necessary teaching ability. Since the preparation time is usually strictly limited, every training session should be planned and prepared for as carefully as possible, and training staff coming from outside the military organization should be given clear instructions as to the aims and purposes of the course.

Since CIMIC activity usually involves the implementation of small-scale community reconstruction projects, the contribution of the civilian component to these should be taken into account in their planning. Projects carried out by the military organization should always be aimed at supporting the goals of the civilian component, and operative models should be created at the planning stage that will ensure that the CIMIC projects complement the developmental work being done by the civilian component in the area.

Successful projects call for efficient financing mechanisms, and the mechanisms available for each operation should be categorized according to their accessibility. Usually the providers of the finance will dictate the sectors of society for which the mechanisms in question are intended, and this will form the first criterion for such a categorization. A further consideration will be the speed with which the finance can be obtained. Mechanisms in which the decision-making process has been brought as close as possible to the user will be appropriate for cases in which a rapid response is required, while slower mechanisms may be planned for in sectors of society where projects are carried out over longer periods of time, e.g. actions to ensure the reliability of electricity supplies.

The duties of a military organization do not usually include the delivery of humanitarian aid, but experiences from various operations suggest that one must be prepared for this. Planning and preparatory work in the humanitarian sphere is governed by the mandate, conditions in the area of operation and the resources and financing mechanisms available. It is in any case important to bear in mind at the planning stage that the military organization may be forced to take part in the provision of humanitarian aid in the initial stages. It is therefore necessary to monitor developments in the area of operation and to identify the organizations with responsibility for humanitarian aid. The true function of the CIMIC branch should be to inform the appropriate organizations of the prevailing situation and to cooperate with them and with the operative branch of the military force to secure delivery of the supplies.

All externally directed activity should be accompanied by proper dissemination of information to the local population, the principal partner organizations at home and in the area of operation and the military organization itself, as active CIMIC work combined with mastery of the media can help to create a positive public image among all external groups. Active publicity can be of assistance in the exe-

cution of small-scale projects, and it can also be a means of activating non-governmental organizations, whose contributions may assume significant proportions during the maintenance stage in the operation, when the aim is to encourage the people to take control of their own affairs and form a properly functioning society once again.³⁰⁷

Suitable publicity methods can also be used to explain the purposes and principles of CIMIC activity to the local people, and thus to avoid practical complications of the kind that are apt to arise from misunderstandings. Similarly the CIMIC staff and their vehicles should be clearly recognisable, although it should be remembered that the use of distinguishing marks is only feasible at the stage when the local population have come to accept the CIMIC troops and their activities. The use of distinctive markings for CIMIC personnel should also help to minimize efforts by local people to make contact with the patrols belonging to the operative branch.³⁰⁸

Special attention should be paid to documentation and reporting during the planning stage, as it must be possible later to ascertain at least the following:

- What is or was regarded as the objective of the activity?
- By what means was it intended that the objective should be achieved?
- What factors led to the choice of this objective?
- Under what conditions were the tasks carried out?
- What was the outcome achieved?
- What observations were made in the course of events that might be useful for the further development of CIMIC activities?

The nature of CIMIC activity requires that an internal system must be created for controlling it and for directing the personnel in all their principal areas of activity. This in turn calls for the prior definition of a task and objective for the CIMIC branch and of the key actions to be taken for implementation of this task. Definition of the objective should take account of the aims of both the military and the civilian component, while the key actions, which usually consist of mediation, the maintaining of contacts with the civilian component, support for coordination of the work of other actors and execution of social reconstruction projects, may vary in the weight assigned to them and may be supplemented by other functions according to the nature of the operation.

Part of the control system entails an obligation for the chief of the CIMIC branch to report to his own superior at predefined intervals on the actions that have been carried out. This should be done from the viewpoint of the overall objective and employing statistics indicative of the performance of key actions. Mention should also be made of any barriers to achievement of the objective, and the factors entailed in these should be placed in perspective relative to the above performance indicators. This will enable adjustments to be made to the future tasks of the CIMIC branch and resources to be assigned to areas that need to be more effective. The quality of the activity achieved may also be assessed in this way, by comparing the performance figures as proportions of overall activity.

5.2 Commencement of CIMIC activity

The CIMIC branch may be looked on as an agency by which the military organization adjusts itself to the operating environment of the crisis management operation, and the commencement of its activities should thus take the form of a review of the processes carried out at the planning stage. A properly executed commencement stage can create favourable conditions for carrying out the task assigned, which requires from a CIMIC point of view:

- coordination of the externally directed activity of the military organization
- formation of a picture of the prevailing situation
- creation and maintenance of suitable conditions for cooperation with respect to
 - international organizations
 - national and international non-governmental organizations
 - the local authorities
 - the local population
- planning of support for social reconstruction together with representatives of the civilian component.

From a CIMIC perspective, externally directed activity implies cooperation between representatives of the military and civilian components and the aim of its coordination is to support achievement of the overall objective, to avoid overlapping use of human resources and to control and exploit the flow of information. The result of such

coordination may be expressed in terms of a set of areas of responsibility for externally directed activity.

The coordination of activity is based on the definition of tasks at each level in the organization. It is the responsibility of those working at the highest level in the organization to cooperate with representatives of the civilian organizations at the same level in order to create policies and instructions to guide the work of the persons and detachments engaged at the planning and operative levels. The task of those at the planning level is to plan the activity itself following the commands and directions coming from the upper level, while the operative level will be responsible for carrying out the planned activity and for reporting back to the planning level on the measures taken and observations made.

Failure to observe the above division of functions may lead to a waste of resources and unnecessary confusion at the practical level. This can be avoided if all the people working at the various levels in the organization are aware of how the flow of information is intended to take place within it, and above all what their own areas of responsibility are.

Since the same branches of a military organization at the local and regional levels should be working in close cooperation with each other as soon as the operation begins, clear definitions of common policies and divisions of responsibility are required from the outset, and for this the higher command must be capable of making use of the lower levels of command and the human resources represented by them. Thus the generation of information within the organization will take place in a "bottom up" manner. Then, by creating good contacts with their opposite numbers in civilian organizations, the higher command can support its subordinates by distributing the results of their own collaboration in order to formulate principles for action and to define policies that will be consistent with those of the main representatives of the civilian component working within the same area.³⁰⁹

The factor regulating externally directed activity in the military organization should be the cooperation list drawn up for it, containing notes of 1) the person, task or organization which is to be the object of cooperation, 2) the responsible person or unit in the military organization, 3) the manner and timing of contacts, and 4) if possible, the product of the cooperation. This product could be a set of data on the refugee situation in an area, for example. The drawing

up and use of a cooperation list of this kind may be looked on as supporting the formation and maintenance of a picture of the situation in the area of operation, which in turn forms the basis for the activities of the military organization.

Experiences gained from several operations suggest that from a CIMIC point of view a picture of the situation should comprise the following elements: 1) security factors, 2) population of the area of operation, 3) social structures, 4) other actors present in the area, and 5) the terrain. The main factors affecting security will be local military organizations, paramilitary organizations, crime, other groups opposed to the peacekeeping force and areas suspected of being mined. It is not the responsibility of the CIMIC branch to investigate such matters, as this should be done elsewhere in the organization, but it may be noted in the light of experience in various operations that CIMIC methods, employing groups working in the field, can be useful for filling out the evaluation of the security situation in an area.

Thus cooperation between the branches within the organization emerges as a crucial element in obtaining an accurate picture of the prevailing situation. Since the CIMIC staff should actively attempt to ensure that they have a correct evaluation available, the best way of doing this is to take part in the planning process for it within their own organization.

The formation of a picture of the situation is a matter in which cooperation with the local population and a knowledge of its particular features is needed. The population data obtained during the planning stage have to be checked and open questions concerning the population of the area resolved, and the two most efficient means of doing this are cooperation with civilian organizations active in the area and fieldwork carried out by the CIMIC teams themselves.

The CIMIC teams must be provided with precise instructions for this, as their first contacts with the local population will set a precedent for that population's impression of the peacekeeping force. Thus, the groups have to be used in such a way that their deployment will serve the purpose of making the force known to the people and creating a favourable public image. Employed correctly, the CIMIC teams operating in the field can constitute one of the most important and most efficient instruments for the gathering of intelligence.

A realistic picture of the prevailing situation should also include an estimate of the functionality of social structures, which should be

performed separately at least for the administrative system, judicial system, health and social welfare system, education system and general infrastructure.

The state of the administrative system in the area of responsibility can have a profound effect on the tasks facing the CIMIC branch, as every effort must be made through CIMIC activity to support the representatives of the local administration in their efforts to improve conditions. Such support will at the same time serve indirectly to increase the population's confidence in the administration, which will in turn be likely to lead to peaceful development. Thus, if the situation permits, efforts should be made when planning the measures to be taken by the military organization in support of social reconstruction to seek ways of including the local authorities in these plans. If there is no local administration, or if it is scarcely functioning, the military organization will have to involve itself in the development of the area and the creation of an administrative system in collaboration with the main civilian organizations. All the above measures represent ways of supporting the development of the area towards the desired end state, and may at the same time be regarded as having the effect of shortening the duration of the operation.

The other social structures mentioned above in connection with the formation of a picture of the situation are ones that are closely connected with the guaranteeing of basic security for the population of the area. The military organization can take steps to determine the existing state of the basic structures, but the general outlines of the action to be taken and the actual development work will nevertheless be in the hands of the civilian organizations to which this is entrusted in each operation separately.³¹⁰

When surveying the situation with regard to civilian actors working in the area, the CIMIC branch should also be able to make use of other branches of the military organization. Experiences gained in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan suggest, for instance, that the patrols on surveillance duty, if furnished with correctly defined instructions, can provide real-time information on new actors appearing in the area. This is also the most efficient means of maintaining up-to-date data on the work of individual actors.³¹¹

The basic data for application to conditions regarding the terrain as far as CIMIC work is concerned are those produced by the operative branch, i.e. the organization's own patrols are able to fill

in the details of the terrain, including information on seasonal variations, which it is always necessary to take into account.

As far as the initiation and later implementation of CIMIC activity is concerned, the necessary conditions for efficient operation are created through cooperation with the main representatives of the civilian component, while from the viewpoint of the military organization the conditions for cooperation are created by means of the internal coordination and maintenance of a realistic picture of the situation discussed above. This cooperation must be planned in such a way that it is implemented consistently at all levels of activity.

The coordination mechanisms and divisions of responsibility applying between actors should be defined in the documents on which individual operations are based, and if this is not done the initiative for bringing about such coordination in their geographical and operative areas and at the appropriate levels must rest with the representatives of the military organization. This can be done in practice by inviting representatives of the civilian component to meet at a prearranged place in each area of responsibility at regular intervals to discuss the coordination question, although admittedly one barrier to this initiative may well be the reluctance of representatives of the civilian component to collaborate with the military.

The CIMIC personnel can do much to demonstrate to representatives of civilian organizations how useful mutual cooperation can be. Experiences with earlier operations suggest that the most effective catalyst for such activity is the military organization's ability to produce information on conditions in the area, for representatives of the civilian component are well aware that such information is vital to their own activities.

The task of maintaining close contact with the population of the area of responsibility can be carried out best by CIMIC teams operating in the field, and by the creation of CIMIC houses or centres wherever this is possible. A CIMIC house is a place where representatives of the local people can contact representatives of the military organization and of civilian organizations working in the area. The decision to create such a building should nevertheless always be dependent on security, the real need for such a facility and the availability of personnel, and it should always be located outside the military base. For this reason means also have to be devised by which representatives of the civilian component can contact the CIMIC staff other than through the CIMIC house.

It is always possible that during the time required for forming a picture of the situation in the area and creating the conditions necessary for cooperation, the peacekeeping force may notice things in the area that call for the immediate provision of aid or the taking of other measures, in which case the force can intervene in the situation in as far as its own resources permit, although the preferable course of action at an early stage in the operation would be to pass the information on to the responsible organization.³¹²

Although any aid provided by the troops or projects undertaken by the CIMIC team should serve the overall objective of the mission, it should also be possible at the initial stage to use these projects as a means of improving the security of the troops and their scope for action. Thus improvements to the road network, for instance, should be of benefit to both the local population and the operative branch of the military organization.

Absolute neutrality should be aimed at in the distribution of humanitarian aid and in the planning and implementation of projects, and care should be taken to ensure that the aid reaches its target and that the projects serve the real purposes for which they are intended. All deliveries of aid should be made on a one-off basis if at all possible, in order to prevent the local population from becoming dependent on the military organization.³¹³

5.3 CIMIC activities during the stabilization stage

A crisis management operation is deemed to have reached the stabilization stage when:

- the tasks of the military organization take on a routine nature³¹⁴
- the focus of attention has moved over to implementing the civilian clauses in the agreements
- the country's administration at all levels is under international supervision
- the local authorities are able to maintain general law and order under international supervision.³¹⁵

As the operation advances towards its overall objectives, it should be possible to adjust the composition of the military organizations to respond to the demands of the operating environment. Suitable conditions for this can be created by drawing up several alternative plans

and defining factors that require changes for their achievement or make changes possible. The control system set out in section 5.2 above will support development of the organization in response to challenges in the operating environment.

The changes in the operating environment envisaged here arise partly on account of the replacement of international organizations by local officials, the defining of new tasks and duties, and in some case reductions in the funding available to the international community.

The development of the military organization in the course of an operation frequently implies in practice a reduction in the troops engaged in actual operative duties, although in such a way that they continue to constitute a sufficient deterrent and to guarantee an adequate level of security under all conditions. At the same time it may well imply an increase in troops capable of CIMIC activities.³¹⁶

Increased efficiency will call not only for organizational changes but also for the creation of CIMIC houses to enable more effective contacts to be maintained with the surrounding community. The facilitation of contacts between the local population or representatives of various civilian organizations and the military organization will often have the effect of creating two-way communication between the components, which is one prerequisite for an increase in the volume of activity.

CIMIC activity at the stabilization stage is mainly a matter of functioning as a catalyst for actions leading to the accomplishment of the objectives of the international community, and in this respect it is possible by exploiting the large manpower resources available to the CIMIC branch by comparison with other organizations to maintain an active watch over the development taking place in various areas and at various levels in society, and also to react rapidly to any problems that arise. Measures devolving on the CIMIC troops in connection with repatriation, for instance, may include the location of potential resettlement areas, monitoring of the day-by-day situation, the exercising of influence on the political climate, the obtaining of resources and the implementation of projects.³¹⁷

It is quite possible to begin the work of identifying potential resettlement areas during the peace enforcement stage, documenting the results in such a way that they will be available for use at a later juncture. Attention should naturally be focused on areas where groups opposed to the repatriation of minorities are not in the ma-

jority and where a basic infrastructure exists, e.g. an adequate road network, availability of water and possibilities for arranging electricity supplies. The most important thing, however, is the psychological atmosphere. At the same time steps should be taken towards supporting the commencement of comparable activities in more difficult areas, e.g. creation of contacts with the local people, consultations with local decision-makers and exploitation of the media³¹⁸

It is possible by CIMIC methods to exercise influence simultaneously at the places where decisions are taken, where the practical work is done and where the resources are allocated, which implies that those working at the upper levels should be capable of influencing the local administration and the system for apportioning resources, while the CIMIC patrols responsible for the fieldwork should be able to influence people's attitudes and play their own part in minimizing interference factors. It also means that real-time communications must exist between the detachments working at these levels where necessary. The activities of those working in the field are dependent on the possession of resources that enable them to intervene wherever problems arise.³¹⁹

The CIMIC units should receive background support from a sufficiently powerful operative force, to provide a deterrent that will enable activity to be commenced in areas where the atmosphere is hostile. This may have the effect of preventing development from stagnating in certain areas.

Although it is characteristic of the maintenance stage that the CIMIC activity comes to be focused more on supporting development in civilian society, attention must be paid in all situations to acquiring the information required for the military organization's operative planning. The importance of the CIMIC branch for operative planning in fact increases at this stage, as it is frequently the largest producer of information, by virtue of its continuous contacts with the surrounding community.³²⁰

The CIMIC branch should also take it upon itself to identify those services available in the local community that are already sufficiently well developed that the troops can make use of them, as this will enable some functions such as food production, construction work and supplies of various materials and other daily commodities to be outsourced.

The opportunity should be taken during the maintenance stage to activate local non-governmental organizations, possibly by arrang-

ing contacts and joint activities with the corresponding organization in the CIMIC unit's home country. Such measures in support of civil society can work well towards the achievement of the overall objectives of the operation.³²¹

The CIMIC projects implemented should for the most part be aimed directly at supporting the focal points of the operation, as this will help to convince the local people of the usefulness of collaboration. Use should be made of local contractors and suppliers wherever possible.³²²

It can happen that by this stage in the operation the CIMIC personnel will, as it were, have drifted into a position in which they are working in very close proximity to the civilian component, forgetting the true objectives of the operation. It may be said from experience, however, that in very many cases the CIMIC branch will have come to act as a catalyst for social reconstruction and an extremely significant implementer of practical measures, and that this will mean that the representatives of the military organization are inevitably extremely closely involved in the processes of reconstruction within the local society. Practical commitment to this reconstruction work can nevertheless detract from the role of a neutral monitor of the overall situation, and in this sense it should be avoided, e.g. through recourse to the internal control system.

5.4 CIMIC activity at the withdrawal stage

A crisis management operation will have progressed to the withdrawal stage when:

- the national authorities are able to take responsibility for law and order without international intervention
- the area has a properly functioning judicial system
- the local armed forces do not constitute a regional threat but are capable of defending their own territory
- the foundations have been laid for economic growth
- the local administration is able to ensure smooth functioning and development in all sectors of society.³²³

The main CIMIC measures to be carried out at this stage are connected with the transfer of responsibility in all fields to the local authorities or international civilian organizations, while at the same

time attempting to minimize the impact of this additional burden on the local community and its development.³²⁴

It is important to note when planning activities at the withdrawal stage whether or not the military organization will retain representatives in the area. In any case it is necessary to inform previous collaborators how they can contact representatives of the military organization later, and above all, who are the correct people to contact. It is also necessary to explain the reasons for the withdrawal of the troops. These measures are essential in order to ensure that all changes in accustomed ways of working in a given organization or some part of it will proceed in a smooth manner.

One additional consideration, of course, is that all ongoing projects should be completed, so as to avoid the situation in which a partially executed project has to be turned over to another actor to be finished off. It is also necessary to emphasize in the planning that a project can be regarded as completed only when all the related reports and statements have been submitted and approved. Completion of the work on site is only one aspect of carrying the project through to the end.

The CIMIC branch is also required to provide support for its own troops by assessing the possibilities for making use of local resources during the withdrawal operation. This may take the form of employing local labour for demolishing bases and using ports and railway facilities for transporting equipment out of the country.³²⁵

6 CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Performance of the research

The process of answering the main question posed in this research entailed definition of the principal fields of civilian crisis management, which is done in Chapter 2, and description of the measures taken in the context of various operations, experiences from which are recounted in Chapter 4 and summarized in Appendix 5. In addition, it required an examination to be made of doctrines and instructions in which guidelines are laid down for military cooperation with the civilian component.

Since the focus of attention in this work was on CIMIC activity, the intention in the discussion of civilian crisis management was to create a frame of reference for describing this activity.

Given that practically no written documentation on CIMIC activity was available during the period when this work was carried out, the principal published material on which it could be based consisted of instructions and regulations. A number of articles and other publications had indeed been produced on the Bosnia and Kosovo operations, but these concerned mostly the reasons for the crises and the consequences of them, so that no extensive treatment of military-civilian cooperation in these contexts had previously been published. A number of NATO internal reports have been produced on the subject, but their perspective does not allow for an objective discussion.

The present research was based mainly on interviews and on reports arising from the operations concerned. The results of an interview are usually one individual's subjective view based on experiences gathered in a particular place and at a particular time, and it was necessary to combine these in order to build up a consistent picture of the object of study. The reports available were mostly broad outlines of the situation at given moments in time, and although their veracity cannot be questioned, their value for the present purposes undoubtedly can.

The content of this work has been influenced by the author's own experiences in the SFOR operation in 1997-1999 and again in 2002 and in connection with the commencement of CIMIC activities in the ISAF operation in 2002. The most important factor affecting the discussion of CIMIC activities was nevertheless the author's

fact-finding visit to Bosnia in autumn 2000, as a result of which the whole existence of stages or phases in CIMIC activity and in an operation as a whole became evident. Thus the principal accent in this work is on the SFOR operation.

The author has received considerable support in his work from personnel engaged in the SFOR and KFOR operations, partly through statements and expressions of opinion that have carried the work forward. The chief drawback has been the fact that the topic is a relatively little-known one, so that extensive discussion of it was more or less impossible.

6.2 Results

The first question to be answered in this work was: What does civilian crisis management consist of? Civilian crisis management is the involvement of a third party in the development of civilian society following a crisis, and as such it always entails an element of political intervention, which controls the resources assigned to it. The work is normally carried out by international organizations, and non-government organizations also play a significant role, although their collaboration with other actors can sometimes cause problems, mostly on account of their desire to remain independent and neutral.

Civilian crisis management always has a closely related temporal aspect. Activity must be commenced as soon as the situation permits, and only a finite time is available for the reconstitution of society. The definition of the actual time available may be complicated, however, by the political climate, the availability of adequate resources and the results achieved. These facts are also interconnected, in that an operation in which the desired results are not achieved may gradually lose the best part of its resources.

Civilian crisis management can cover all aspects of civilian society, the areas concerned in a particular case being determined by the nature of the crisis and its consequences. The following fields, at least, fall within its scope:

- restoration of the social order
- development of administration and democracy
- promotion of economic recovery
- revival of social and health services
- improvement of the whole infrastructure

safe environment. Support that does not form part of normal military activities should be provided only on a one-off basis, however.

Experiences with the SFOR and KFOR operations suggest that troops functioning at the local or regional level cannot afford to commit their human or material resources to one single task, in addition to which the support provided by a military organization must be clearly connected with the main objectives of the military mission. National differences also exist in the forms of assistance the troops are willing to provide.

At a local or regional level a military organization can provide its most effective support for civilian crisis management in fields of activity where large amounts of manpower are needed rather than specialized expertise. One example of this is the active participation by CIMIC units in repatriation measures within the SFOR operation. It is possible at the operative level, however, to involve the troops in activity that requires more specialized skills, although it is always a question of the human resources available at the time and their prioritization.

The significance of military support can be determined on the basis of the activities pursued by CIMIC units, the fundamental task of which is to link the military and civilian components together in order to achieve greater impact through the coordination of their efforts. Thus the area of operation of the CIMIC personnel as such should be at the interface between these two elements. If activity is directed too deeply within the civilian component the chances of working in support of the military organization's objectives will be jeopardized. It is thus important that the benefits emerging from CIMIC activity should be at least three-dimensional: 1) benefits to civilian crisis management, 2) benefits to the military organization, and 3) benefits in terms of local development.

The concrete support that the military component can provide for representatives of the civilian component at the local and regional levels are set out in Appendix 5, the content of which is derived from observations made in connection with the SFOR and KFOR operations. These are all forms of support that have been repeated more than once, and thus the list may be regarded as being fairly generally applicable. It should be noted, however, that in practice each measure should be carefully assessed and planned in relation to the case in question, and that the assessment should include its benefit in relation to the overall military objective, which should never

- stimulation of culture and education
- establishment of external relations
- civil defence.
- boundary patrolling and customs
- civil protection
- refugees and displaced persons

The European Union has attempted to prepare itself for future crises by concentrating on certain areas of focus defined in accordance with earlier experiences and problems. It is not evident from the planning processes, however, what functions it should be able to perform with the troops reserved for this purpose. It is only in the case of the police force that it is specifically laid down that it should be capable of carrying out the most demanding tasks normally expected of this branch.

One feature that the above fields of activity in the scope of civilian crisis management and the areas of focus defined by the EU have in common is the indeterminacy of the boundaries between them. They are not independent, enclosed units, but rather each is capable of influencing the others. Thus successful civilian crisis management calls for organizations that are capable of a high degree of coordination, have the potential for working at all levels in an operation and are able to carry on cooperation between levels.

A successful civilian crisis management operation requires that the correct priorities should be defined between the measures taken, as this will save on resources. Similarly, there should be clear definitions of the objectives that take account of the standards attained in the various aspects of society in the country concerned prior to the crisis.

The second question that this work set out to answer was: **What factors have influenced CIMIC as implemented by the Finns?**

The CIMIC activity implemented by the Finns as been influenced especially markedly by the freedom of action that is typical of our military culture and the high level of personal knowledge and skills that the troops have been able to contribute in different areas of activity. Decisive in this respect has been the body of skills contributed by members of the reserves.

A frame of reference for the activity has been provided by the commands and instructions issued by the higher command levels, but these have served only as general guidelines. One of the prob-

fact-finding visit to Bosnia in autumn 2000, as a result of which the whole existence of stages or phases in CIMIC activity and in an operation as a whole became evident. Thus the principal accent in this work is on the SFOR operation.

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be endangered at any stage.

The main barriers to cooperation between military and civilian organizations lie in the attitudes of the staff on both sides and the lack of coordination mechanisms. A CIMIC unit can do much to overcome these barriers, most especially through the dissemination of information on its own activities.

6.3 Reliability and usefulness of the results

Civilian crisis management is a broad topic of research and one in which precise delimitation of the scope of the work is somewhat problematic. The delimitation was made here at the organization level, by concentrating mainly on EU civilian crisis management measures. It could have been done equally well in terms of the areas covered by civilian crisis management, of course, and it must be admitted that the present solution led to a somewhat narrow scope in the results as far as the civilian component was concerned. On the other hand, this approach did allow observations to be made on overlapping between the areas of civilian crisis management and the need for coordination between them which can well be made use of in future planning. Similarly the observations on the duration of civilian crisis management may help to add precision to the current relatively indeterminate form of this activity. All in all the content of Chapter 2 is slightly fragmentary, although this was to be expected, as the intention was to define the fields of civilian crisis management with sufficient accuracy that the findings could be made use of later.

From the military perspective, the discussion of civilian crisis management and the conclusions based on this support the planning of CIMIC activities. It should be noted, however, that the conditions in each area of operation determine in the last resort what fields of civilian crisis management it is reasonable for the military organization to involve itself in.

One of the key notions in this research has been that of the combined influence of the military and civilian elements. From the viewpoint of a military organization it is important to monitor the development of civilian crisis management at least to the extent described here, as this will allow the military planning process to take the civilian component into account.

The results obtained in the research into CIMIC activity may be regarded as good, to say the least. The nature of this activity is brought out in a very concrete form, although the value of the findings is reduced by the narrowness of the treatment of practical measures in section 4.3. These matters are unfortunately frequently referred to only in the form of lists, so that it is not possible to provide any broader description of the activity concerned. The fault lay partly in the poor content of the available reports and other documents, although it must be remembered, too, that up to now such activity at the local and regional levels has been in the hands of only a small number of military representatives.

The presentation of CIMIC planning and implementation in Chapter 5 should enable preparations to be made for future operations, although it should be remembered that the present description is based only on experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, so that the same elements will not necessarily be to the fore in a future operation. If this operation were to be of the kind carried out by the UN in Macedonia, for instance, the focus of CIMIC activity might well be on the promotion of relations between the troops and the host nation, possibly partly with a view to utilizing local resources in the military activities. No activity of this kind was necessary in Bosnia, for example.

NOTES

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
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282. Uotila, interview, as above.
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3971. Idem.
398. Idem.
399. Idem.
300. Helminen, interview, as above.
301. Laitinen, interview, as above.
302. Hämeenlinna Rotary Club sponsored the furnishing of a village school in Bosnia in 1998 as a result of a talk given at one of its meetings by an officer from the Finnish Battalion on the situation in the area.
303. See definitions of military and civilian crisis management.
304. Kääriäinen, interview, as above.
305. Kääriäinen, interview, as above. Lehtisalo, interview, as above.
306. Suvikas, interview, as above. Loikkanen, interview, as above.
307. Uotila, interview, as above.
308. CIMIC insignia were adopted for use by personnel and on vehicles the first time in the SFOR operation in 1999. This meant that the CIMIC troops were no longer mistaken for operational troops.


309. Maturo, interview, as above. Fyfe, interview, as above. Kolacz, interview, as above. Aaltonen, interview, as above.
310. Suvikas, interview, as above. Kurkinen, experiences.
311. Sainio, interview, as above. Lehtisalo, interview, as above.
312. MNB (C) SOI 17, G3 Civil Military Operations (CMO), January 2000. Section 108-C1.
313. Helminen, interview, as above. Virhiä, interview, as above.
314. Routine duties can be taken to include patrolling, guarding of strategic sites, and the inspections of troops belonging to the parties to the dispute as allowed for in the peace treaty.
315. Jouwlan, George, & Shoemaker, Christopher, p. 9.
316. Suomalainen Jääkäripataljoona, Komentotoimiston ak no 1377/Dg, 10.1.2000.
Toimintakertomus 01.07.1999 - 05.01.2000.
317. Helminen, interview, as above. Virhiä, interview, as above. Maturo, interview, as above.
318. Pääesikunta, kansainvälinen osasto. SOBH:n muutto Tuzlaan ja toiminnan aloittaminen uudella alueella. Muistio, N:ttä, 6/2001. The first measure to be taken on moving to a new area should be to obtain a realistic picture of the situation there. Detailed databases on the area had been compiled in 1998-1999, but these could not be made available to the SOBH.
319. Experiences in Bosnia indicate that suitable conditions for action by CIMIC troops can be created through the opportunity to use the force's own pioneer troops at once should the need arise. Adequate financial resources for carrying out small-scale projects are also a useful means of support.
320. Teittinen, interview, as above.
321. Melasuo, Tuomo. EU:n Välimeren-politiikka ja Suomi. Ulkopoliitiikka 2/00, pp. 53-70.
322. Permi, interview, as above.
323. Jouwlan, George, & Shoemaker, Christopher. Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond. December 1998. <http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/joul/joul.htm> (21.3.2001). p. 9.
324. MNB (C), Standing Operating Instructions. NATO restricted - releasable to KFOR. July 2000, p. W-1.
325. AJP-4.5, Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine & Procedures, NATO/EAPC unclassified. Ratification draft - 3 October 2000, pp. 3-5.

Appendix 1.

RESEARCH PROCEDURE



FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR THE RESEARCH



Appendix 3.

FUNCTIONAL ENTITIES IN DETACHMENT G5 OF THE NORDIC-POLISH BRIGADE (SFOR) AND THEIR DUTIES IN 1998-1999

SECTOR	AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY	COOPERATION PARTNERS
Democratization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - human rights monitoring - liaison with authorities - support for elections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IPTF, UNCA, OSCE, UNHCR, ECMM, OHR, local authorities
Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - coordination of project planning and implementation in own area of responsibility - organization and coordination of project finance at lower levels of command - project collaboration between organizations and local contractors - cooperation with sector responsible for regional monitoring to define potential projects - cooperation with repatriation and resettlement sector in supporting projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU - UNSAID - UNHCR - NGOs (for projects) - internal cooperation
Regional monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - monitoring of political and economic situation - formation and maintenance of village and town databases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - local authorities - ECMM - internal cooperation
Repatriation and resettlement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - displaced persons and refugees - citizens' freedom of movement - monitoring of local property legislation and its implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNHCR - NGOs - internal cooperation
CIMIC centres	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - liaison with other action in the area and the local population - cooperation in matters arising with battalion responsible for the area battalions - action as an information channel from the brigade to civilian society 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - local population - IOs and NGOs - responsible - internal cooperations

Source: NORDPOL BED/SFOR SOP 501/G-5/CIMIC, October 1998

Appendix 4.

FUNCTIONAL ENTITIES AND THEIR SUBDIVISIONS IN THE CIMIC BRANCH OF THE NORDIC-POLISH BATTLE GROUP (SFOR) IN 2000-2001

PUBLIC FUNCTIONS	ECONOMY AND TRADE	CIVILIAN INFRA-STRUCTURE	HUMANITARIAN AID	CULTURE
Administration	Economic development	Telecommunications	Displaced persons and refugees	Historical buildings and monuments
Elections	Agriculture and food	Transport	Medical assistance	Art and archives
Judicial system	Industry	Employment	Essential supplies	Religious functions
Health	Commerce	Electricity, water etc.	Supervision of human rights	Language-services
Education		Rescue services (citizens' security etc.)		
General security				
Environment				

Source: Nordic-Polish Battle Group, Standing Operating Procedures. SFOR restricted, May 2000.

Appendix 5.

CONCRETE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT

AREA	SUPPORT THROUGH NORMAL TROOP OPERATIONS	SUPPORT THROUGH CIMIC ACTIVITIES
General forms of support in all areas include the ensuring of security, and thereby the creation of suitable conditions in which activities can take place, and the placing of premises on military bases at the disposal of representatives of the civilian component.		
1. Restoration of social order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - communication of detailed information on the area of responsibility - establishment of peaceful/stable conditions - maintenance of law and order - detention of criminals - protection of police operations - joint patrols - border control - maintenance of personnel evacuation plans - supervision of actions of local authorities and dissemination of information on them - material support - educational support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - communication of detailed information on the population and authorities of the area of responsibility - material donations to the local police force - support for local police training
2. Development of administration and democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ensuring of a safe operating environment - communication of detailed information on the area of responsibility - personnel training - security - communications - mine safety - map-reading - medication - supervision of the area of responsibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - location of voters - location of polling stations - arranging of training in election procedures - transport and storage of election material - preparations for public events - resettlement - festivals for minority groups - performing of local authority duties - provision of information on local attitudes and opinions

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - maintenance of an evacuation plan and training for this - supervision of the activities of the local police - implementation of citizens' human rights - implementation of citizens' freedom of movement 	
3. Support for the restoration of the economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - creation of jobs in connection with the force's own basic functions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - creation of jobs through projects and other aid activities - arranging of re-training for employment - making use of local companies in the provision of material aid - arranging of minor start-up loans for basic production and small-scale industry - arranging of commercial training
4. Support for restoration of the health and social welfare services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ensuring the provision of emergency first aid services - reception of returning refugees and displaced persons in the most problematical areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - implementation of emergency first aid services - planning of the reconstitution of the health care system - direction of the work of national NGOs in problem areas - repair of ambulances - delivery of medicines received as aid to local health centres and hospitals - projects for renovation of health centre and hospital buildings
5. Support for restoration of the general infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - supervision and guarding of project sites 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - support for civilians responsible for projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - provision of detailed information on area of responsibility - determination of resources available in the area - support for projects by making the force's own services available to them (e.g. banks, post offices, telecommunications, computing) - implementing projects that contribute to the whole effort - implementing smaller projects that support the whole effort
6. Displaced persons and refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - protection of transport of materials - protection of returning minority groups and the preparations for their return 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - provision of detailed information on area of responsibility - surveying of possible sites for resettlement of displaced persons - preparations for return of displaced persons <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - influencing opinions - cooperation with local authorities - transport of materials - documentation of the return of displaced persons - coordination and support for the work of aid organizations - mediation in disputes between contributing parties - implementation of projects to support the return of displaced persons

ABBREVIATIONS

ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff.
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation.
CML	Civil-Military Liaison.
CMO	Civil-Military Operations, abbreviation used in MNB(C) for the CIMIC branch.
CJCMTF	Combined Joint Civil Military Co-operation Task Force. CIMIC unit at the operational level (SFOR).
CJ9	CIMIC branch at the operational level in the SFOR and KFOR operations.
ECMM	European Commission Monitory Mission.
EU	European Union.
FDIA	Finnish Detachment in Afghanistan.
FinBn	Finnish Battalion.
FINCENT	Finnish Defence Forces International Centre
G5	Brigade and division-level CIMIC branch in the SFOR operation.
IFOR	Implementation Force, a NATO-led multinational crisis management force that began operations in Bosnia in December 1995 and was disbanded in December 1996. Predecessor of SFOR.
IO	International Organization, an organization that is internationally recognised and is able to function at an international level, e.g. the UN organizations.
IPTF	International Police Task Force, the UN police organization in Bosnia.
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force, a multinational crisis management operation located in Kabul.
KFOR	Kosovo Force, the NATO-led multinational crisis management force in Kosovo.
KPS	Kosovo Police Service, the local police force to be created in Kosovo.
MNB(C)	Multinational Brigade (Centre), a British-led multinational brigade in the KFOR operation.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization, an organization that operates on a voluntary basis and is not funded by any national government.
NORDCAPS	Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NPB	Nordic-Polish Brigade, in the SFOR operation.
NPBG	Nordic-Polish Battle Group, in the SFOR operation.
OHR	Organization of the High Representative, the highest official supervising observance of the Bosnia peace agreement, and his organization.
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
PfP	Partnership for Peace, NATO partnership programme.
PIC	Peace Implementation Council, strategic-level working group directing the Bosnia operation.
RDMHQ	Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (UN).
RRTF	Reconstruction and Return Task Force. OHR body for coordinating repatriation and humanitarian aid.
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO).
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (NATO).
SCE	Support to the Civil Environment.

SFOR	Stabilization Force, a NATO-led multinational crisis management operation in Bosnia. Successor to IFOR.
STF	Support to the Force.
S5	Battalion-level CIMIC branch in the SFOR operation.
UN	United Nations.
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

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